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ABSTRACT 
HANDLING THE WAVE: AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL IN EGYPT AFTER THE 
ARAB UPRISINGS 
ZORLU, Begüm 
 
M.A. THESIS, June, 2016 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bülent Aras 
Keywords: Arab Uprisings, Authoritarian Survival, Egypt 
 
At the beginning of 2011, after two weeks of contentious protests setting off from Cairo 
and spreading to numerous cities in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, who was ruling the country 
with an iron fist for 25 years, left his seat. Albeit his departure and the characteristic of 
the social movement that presented a capacity for a change towards democratization, the 
direction of the progression turned into the reconstitution of the authoritarian regime 
which was strengthened with the military coup in 2013, creating a more repressive 
mode of governance before the uprising.  
 
The research setting off from this repercussion, discloses the strategies deployed by the 
regime to reconstruct authoritarianism in Egypt at the aftermath of the popular uprising 
that took place in 2011, as a single case study.  
 
To deduct the path that led to authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt, the first section 
encompassing the methodology provides a theoretical framework that covers the 
literature on authoritarian survival and social movements theory. The second part of the 
study presents the historical background of protest activity in Egypt with a focus on the 
process between 2011 to 2013 by parting it to three waves; the 18 days that led to 
Mubarak’s fall, the reign of the military and the Morsi era. The third section gathers and 
decodes the process and reveals the strategies that were used to re-establish 
authoritarianism at the aftermath of the historical case of the popular uprising in Egypt.  
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ÖZET 
 
ARAP AYAKLANMALARINDAN SONRA MISIR’DA OTORİTERLİĞİN 
YENİDEN İNŞASI 
ZORLU, Begüm 
  
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, Haziran 2016 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Bülent Aras 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Ayaklanmaları, Mısır, Otoriter Ayakta Kalış 
 
Mısır’da Arap Ayaklanmaları bağlamında 2011 yılının ilk ayında başlayıp iki haftaya 
yakın süren, Kahire’den yola çıkıp çeşitli şehirlere yayılan halk ayaklanmasından sonra 
25 yıldır ülkeyi yöneten başkan Hüsnü Mübarek koltuğunu terk etti. Mübarek’in gidişi 
ve sosyal hareketin niteliğinin demokratikleşmeye neden olacağı tahmin edilirken, 2013 
yılında gerçekleşen darbe Mısır’da otoriterliği yeniden inşa ederek önceki yönetimden 
daha baskıcı bir yönetim oluşturdu.  
Bu tezin hareket noktası, 2011 yılında gerçekleşen halk ayaklanmasından sonra 
otoriterliğin yeniden inşasında kullanılan stratejileri tekli durum çalışması ile açığa 
çıkartmaktır. 
Araştırma, Mısır’da otoriterliğin yeniden inşanın yolunu açığa çıkarmak için ilk 
bölümde teorik bir çerçeve ile otoriter ayakta kalış ve sosyal hareketler teorilerini 
inceliyor. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü Mısır’da sosyal hareket ve protestolara tarihsel bir 
giriş sunarak 2011 ayaklanmasından, 2013 darbesine kadar gerçekleşen süreci 3 alt 
başlıkla izliyor: Mübarek’in düşüşünü sağlayan 18 gün, ordunun yönetimi ve Mursi’nin 
devri. Üçüncü bölüm ise aktörleri ve süreci bir araya getirip, deşifre edip, Mısır’da 
gerçekleşen tarihi vakadaki otoriterliğin yeniden inşasında kullanılan yöntemleri açığa 
çıkarıyor.  
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GLOSSARY 
6th of April Movement: Famous for the mobilization of protestors to Tahrir Square 
with leftist leaning that was founded in 2008 in support of the workers in El-Mahalla 
El-Kubra, that were going to have a strike on April 6 
 
Al-Azhar:  A 1,000-year-old mosque and university often considered the highest seat 
of learning in the Sunni Islam world1 
 
Assabiya: Assabiya is social solidarity in Arabic 
 
Feloul: Feloul meaning remnants in Arabic signifies the ousted officials of the Mubarak 
era in post 25thof January Uprising 
 
Intifah: The policy that was named after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s move for 
opening the door to private investment in Egypt  
 
Freedom and Justice Party: (FJP) Freedom and Justice Party was a novel formation 
driving from the Muslim Brotherhood allied with various political forces under the 
Democratic Alliance Coalition in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Uprising. The 
party was founded on April 30, 2011, and dissolved on August  9, 2014 
 
Kefaya Movement: Kefaya meaning enough in English is a coalition of diverse 
political movements that was united and formed against the authoritaraian rule of Hosni 
Mubarak for disabling the transition of power from to his son Gamal in the early 
2000’s. It is officialy named as the Egyptian Movement for Change 
 
Misr al-Kawiya Party: The Strong Egypt Party is an opposition party that comes from 
an Islamic background, which was established following the January 25 Revolution in 
2011. Led by Abdoul Futuh, it opposes the role of military in political affairs describes 
itself as centre-left and moderate Islamist (Arian, 2012) 
 
Maglis El-Shaab: The People’s Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
Maglis El-Shura: The Consultative Council of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
Grand Mufti of the Republic: The highest religious authority in Egypt that exists 
since 1895 
 
Silmiya: Silmiya that means peaceful in Arabic was one of the main slogans used in the 
Egyptian Uprising of 2011 
                                                
1 As Khalil explains ‘part mosque, part university, part center of religious research and knowledge, al-Azhar is 
perhaps the central and certainly the most prestigious element in the state–religion complex in Egypt’. (Khalil, 2011) 
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Tamarod: Tamarod means rebel in Arabic. It was a petition campaign that set off in 
mid-2013 that called for Mohammed Morsi’s resignition 
  
Thawra: Thawra means revolution in Arabic 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1.1.Introduction 
Over the last five years, many articles started with a reference to Mohammad Bouazizi,  
a 26-year-old street vendor from a small city called Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. He set his 
body on fire on 17 December 2010 as a response to his frustration to the municipal 
police but overall the corrupt and unjust system that had dominated Tunisians for an 
excessively long time. This desperate act of a huckster against bad governance, 
corruption and oppression have been taken as the milestone for the development that 
became recognized as the Arab Spring. 
 
While his name was heard in the coffee shops and social media platforms around the 
Middle East, he was becoming the symbol of the popular uprisings that transformed and 
still alter the dynamics of the region and the World today. As the uprising passed on to 
other Arab nations varying in vastness and influence, the connotation ‘spring’ became 
common for addressing the wave of protests due to its non-violent nature, speed and the 
demands it set off.  
 
Whereas ‘spring’ was associated with the movement right after it set off, the failure of 
expected democratic transitions in most of the countries, furthermore, the increase in 
authoritarian measures pending to sight after 2012 started a process of re-naming the 
outcome of the uprisings as a ‘winter’ and brought back the prior disucssions that 
democratization in Arab societies is just impossible2.   
 
                                                
2 For Arab societies and democratization see Diamond (2002), Diamond and Plattner (2014), Bellin, (2004, 2012), 
Oliver, (2012) Yom (2005), Lust-Okar (2005), and Sadiki (2004, 2012). 
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Apart from this broad generalized outlook to the region, the outcome of the revolts of 
2011 has been crucially dissimilar in every single Arab country. The aftermath of the 
uprisings was molded by the dynamics and structures of each one. While the dictators in 
Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt left their seats, Bahrain, Yemen have been stage to military 
interventions from their neighbors and Syria was dragged into one of the worst conflicts 
of the century. Whereas, the aftermath of the international military intervention that 
rebounded Gaddafi’s fall in Libya has failed to succeed a stable governance, the 
monarchies endured in the wave.  
 
The uprisings in the Arab countries,3 that mainly spread after the fall of Mubarak in 
Egypt bared similarities to the post-Soviet transition movements like the Orange or 
‘color revolutions’. This was coupled with the usage of the term ‘spring’ as the outset 
encompassed mainly non-violent and rights based demonstrations. 
 
There have been protests throughout the region differing on subjects -religious, socio-
economic- and time periods but the feature of this wave was the emergence of common 
characteristics as it took place simultaneously among the nations and was regime 
challenging. It was named ‘spring’ because apart from the timing there was a similarity 
that arose in the methods that the protestors pursued and their eagerness. The slogans 
were imitated from one country to another, and the protestors in all countries tried to 
occupy their city squares. While some were hesitant and some more courageous the 
protests started with one thing in common; discrediting violence. The slogan that passed 
from country to country was; ‘ash-shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām’ ‘the people want to bring 
down the regime’. 
 
The people brought down rulers in some countries. In the Arab World, the 
mobilizations did the unpredictable; they reached the specific objective that toppled 
down the dictators of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya and undoubtedly challenged the 
authority in all countries in the region. The spark that was lit from the Arab countries 
with the frustration of masses against their regimes has taken its place and references in 
various social movements around the World. Movements like the Rose Revolution, 
                                                
3 The uprisings mainly took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. 
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Occupy, Chile Student’s Riots without concentrate leaders, aimed at occupying squares, 
and proposed specific targets shared similarities with the Arab Spring.  
 
By this means, to investigate the recent development in the region, studies of 
mobilization appropriated a central place. Mobilizations brought out the clashing 
practices within the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ that had dynamic connotations in particular 
conjunctures. The mobilizations under the broader term collective action4 signifying an 
act carried about by a group of people to address a spesific goal in each case created an 
exceptional dynamic to be explored.  
 
However, studying mobilization alone was not sufficient to explain the developments 
that occurred in the Arab World after the uprisings. Though the methods and the 
demands were similar in the set off throughout the region, the outcomes in every 
country were diverse. While some resulted in a change of governance, some confronted 
waves of violence, authoritarian reconstruction, some reforms and civil war.  
 
Additionally, the characteristics of 2011 which made up the ‘spring’ gradually started to 
vanish in the following period. What was becoming common was the necessary 
suppression to the engagements by the respective ruling coalitions. These responses by 
the governments were a result of a learning process that occurred with the dynamic that 
the protest caused.  Collective action has pushed authoritairan structures to re-invent 
strategies to hold on to power. What began with the popular uprisings was that it 
transformed the traditional relationship, added a new dynamic between the authoritarian 
regimes and their societies and has created a lurch to the authoritarian structure of the 
countries. The process in the near aftermath of the popular mobilization showed that 
there has to be more focus on how it threatens authoritarian regimes as it became an 
existential challenge for it. 
 
While the suddenness of the uprisings was one of the most current debates in 2011, 
Salamey and Pearson (2012) pointed out that the outbreaks are not unexpected 
eruptions, nevertheless the growth of experiences by particular groups. The authors 
                                                
4 According to Britannica, collective action occurs when some people work together to achieve some common 
objective.	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emphasized on the fact that apart from the historical grievances of specific groups based 
on their social, cultural, economic or tribal inequalities, one important factor was the 
political learning process that came with the protest, new modes of communication, 
globalization and the influence of non-violent rights-based movements. (Salamey and 
Pearson, 2012) This was a phenomenon to be investigated for the authoritarians as well. 
While the political experiences of the deprived unfolded in a learning process, so did 
the contrary experiences that the regimes attained in the aftermath of a mass 
mobilization. 
In 2011, Egypt experienced a democratic revolution in the sense that it resulted in the 
experience of a real democratic platform.  The collective consciousness shaped by the 
popular movements were visible at the city centers and from all of the squares of the 
Arab World that were on the agenda on 2011, Midan Tahrir, known as Tahrir Square 
where the popular protests led to Mubarak’s resignation in 18 days. When Hamid 
Dabashi was saying ‘we need metaphors to understand the Arab Spring’ (Oktay and 
Ayndınkaya, 2011:55) the uprising have already started to create new methods for 
collective movements to organize and act. As Hardt and Negri (2011) said: ‘Egyptian 
squares, streets had become parliaments, forums of negotiation and battlegrounds’.  
 
When the protests set off, the confrontations with the security forces did remain in the 
borders of self-defense alike the protests that took place in Europe at 2008. Comparing 
it to the Syntagma Square in Athens as Sharp underlined: ‘the square did remain 
relatively safe spaces and did not break down into the kind of Hobbesian chaos that the 
media invariably claimed’ (Sharp, 2012:129). The emerging components had effect in 
uniting movements that were geographically apart. Tahrir was similar to the Occupy 
Movement in the US with the ties that emanated in the protesting platforms like the 
existence of libraries, tents, and kitchens in the square. It was no coincidence that a year 
later the chants of Tahrir Square were reflected in the Occupy movement in the US. 
While giving enthusiasm abroad, the experience of 2011 in the Middle East was 
reflected in the literature of non-violent social movements, the similarities were short-
lived.  
 
The Egyptian Uprising that was named as the ‘Egyptian Revolution’ or ‘25 January 
Uprising’ marked a united demand that arose from below; the resignation of President 
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Hosni Mubarak. Demonstrations took place almost in every city in Egypt, and the 
squares were filled with people from various social and political classes. In the 18 days 
that the realization of the demand was reached. There were no prominent sectarian 
slogans and specific leadership. Slogans of bread, freedom and social justice, human 
dignity, and political freedom were dominating the discourse. The movement created 
new metaphors for how Egyptians defined themselves with solidarity, abnegation, a 
common goal and the ability to conduct a shared decision. 
 
As the research prospects, the outcome of the 18 days demonstrated a remarkable social 
mobilization, a grassroots uprising that was met with an authoritairan counter move 
which is an obvious example of authoritarian survival/authoritarian learning. It is 
viewed as a reconstruction process that set off from the 18 days that led to the removal 
of Mubarak and was strengthened in the path that resulted in the military coup in mid-
2013.  
 
The successes of the 18 days firstly came with the fact that it has reached its demand to 
remove the dictator. The period that followed Mubarak’s departure encompassed rights-
based movements, the first free elections in Egyptian history, various referendums and a 
confrontation with one of the main pillars of the Egyptian state: the army. As the 
movement from below continued its quest for democratic governance, authoritarian 
reconstruction continued and on the other hand, finally resulted in the coup that took 
place in June 2013. Since then all opposition and protest movements have been 
criminalized in the country, placing Egypt to a worse subordinated condition on rights 
and freedoms. 
 
Additionally, there were many debates about categorizing, naming the protests in the 
region and the uprising in Egypt that comprised of changing dynamics between January 
2011 to June 2013. Studies of democratization were one of them, and the movements 
were seen as a late-comer to the third wave of democratization that Huntington (1992) 
described. The discontent had similarities with waves that occurred after the end of 
military regime in Latin America or the Color Revolutions which Huntington named the 
third wave of democracy that encompassed transition to democracy in non-democratic 
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regimes during a particular period, taking place due to the loss of the consensus for the 
authoritarian regime and the snowballing of the protests (Huntington, 1996).  
 
However, the uprisings in the region showed quickly that the experience was not the 
extension of a third or neither the fourth wave of democratization, but there was a more 
crucial subject to be explored that hindered the process of democratization; the survival 
of the authoritarian regimes.  
 
Valbjørn and Bank (2010) had highlighted that research on the Middle East should 
focus on how authoritarianism reproduces itself rather than democratization. There is a 
long history of protest, discontent in the Arab countries but not many examples of 
regime change or the overthrow of leaders due to a mass uprising. After the fall of 
colonial rule in the Arab World, there have been few significant cases of popular 
mobilization and not any of them was ‘regime threatening’. The distinctiveness of the 
Arab Uprisings was that the mobilizations influenced the dynamics of the mass popular 
movements and transformed the question on what are the factors that keep authoritarian 
regimes stand on their feet. Therefore, in order to understand the wave that occurred and 
how the authoritarianism reproduced itself in 2011, it became crucial to investigate the 
strategies that were put forward.  
 
Accordingly, the research, departing from the exceptionality of the cases to contribute 
to the literature of authoritarian survival and reveal the Egyptian experience, investigate 
authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings by exploring how the 
collective action that constituted the demand to challenge the authoritarian regime 
ruling in Egypt failed to overcome the persistence of authoritarianism in the country. It 
focuses on the question how the authoritarian regime in Egypt rebuild itself after the 
mass demonstrations that shifted the power structure within the ruling elite. 
 
Consequently, the study aims to reveal the forces of the reconstruction of the regime in 
Egypt by reading the subtexts of the uprising, the testimonies, the literature on 
authoritarianism, social movements theory and history from below with the quest for 
contributing to the literature on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian learning.  
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In the pursuit of finding answers, it will provide the theoretical framework of 
authoritarian survival and social movements theory in the first chapter. In the second 
chapter, by giving the substructure of the historical background of protest activity in 
Egypt, it will focus on the process between January 2011 to July 2013 by parting it into 
three waves that highlight changing dynamics. These waves will be composed of the 18 
days that led to Mubarak’s fall, the reign and the fall of the interim military rule and the 
election of Morsi to his downfall. The last chapter will gather and answer the questions 
on authoritarian survival in this context and reveal the strategies that were used to re-
establish authoritarianism at the aftermath of the historical case of the popular uprising 
in Egypt.  
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1.2.Methodology  
 ‘Handling the Wave: Authoritarian Survival in Egypt’ explores the methods of 
reconstruction of the authoritarian regime in Egypt after a regime threatening collective 
movement/mobilization, at a spesific period from January 2011 to June 2013. The study 
proposes that the mass/popular movement that set off at Egypt in January 2011 has 
created a new learning process for the authoritarian regime in the country and produced 
tete a tete relationship between the social movement and the governance.  
 
Heading off from the complexity and genuinely of the uprisings the research aims to 
investigate the case of authoritarian reconstructing in Egypt. In the selection of the case 
as Aras had pointed out Egypt has always possessed a decisive role in the wider Arab 
world; (Aras, 2014) and the uprisings in the region were mainly inspired by the 
aftermath of the fall of Mubarak in Egypt. 
 
The focus of this research is not categorizing a specific model of Egyptian 
authoritarianism but rather reveal the relationship between the dependent variable; 
authoritarian reconstruction with the independent variable; mass protest. As Heydemann 
(2015) put, the recent developments that the Arab World, experienced in this specific 
time period defers from other studies on authoritarianism or process of democratization 
due to the changes and demands that came with new telecommunications technology, 
pressures for democratic and economic reform. The transformation resulted in a new 
reality to be explored.  
 
In this descriptive case study, the independent variable of the research is what the 
protests have succeeded or altered with the mass movement. In order to explain this 
relation, the research exposes the authoritarian tactics that were used to counter the 
dynamics of the mass protest after the Arab Uprisings in Egypt. Examining the process 
reveals how successful the regime was in containing and sustaining its authoritarian rule 
which is called authoritarian survival.  
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1.2.1. Authoritarian Survival in Egypt as a Single Case Study 
 
The primary reason to conduct a single case study lies in the uniqueness of a particular 
social movement. Yin (1984) had pointed out that explanatory research concludes on 
credible explanations which are consistent with the facts and provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the outcome of popular movement as it presents data bearing cause-
effect relationships.  
 
Eva Bellin makes a crucial point by saying that: ‘there is no single roadmap for 
democratization in the globe and what was a success in another country, even for 
neighboring nations will not be the determinant of how the other will democratize.’ 
(Bellin, 2012).  
 
In his quest for attaining a specialized agenda for on the repercussions of social 
movements Giguini (1999) points out compatible models fail in relation to general 
causes as there are no stable motives in life itself. For him, ‘different conditions and 
historical circumstances are conducive to varying movement outcomes.’ (Giugini, 1999: 
27). 
 
As authoritarian reconstruction is determined with the distinct tensions of individual 
regimes (Heydemann, 2007), a single case study is the suited mission to investigate the 
causes of authoritarian resilience in Egypt. Heydemann (2007) points out that by 
‘expanding to areas of controlled political contestation authoritarian survival remains 
different in every regime’. Even though the concluding patterns that are revealed at the 
end of the analysis can contribute to the general theories on authoritarianism and 
authoritarian survival as authoritarians tend to learn from each other, the experiences of 
every case must be investigated.  
 
In this regard, to expose the relationship between authoritarian survival and mass 
protest in Egypt, this chapter continues with the theoretical discussions on authoritarian 
survival and mass protest. The literature on protest and social movements contribute to 
defining the experience of the uprising that auspicated in 2011. 
 
	  
 
 
10	  
The second chapter provides the historical background to the independent variable; 
mass protest and focuses on the process within and after the January 25 Uprising for 
conceding the interaction between the dynamics that emerged after the grassroots 
movement and the responses of the authoritarian regime to the emerging dynamics. 
Finally, the last chapter examines the specific time period, reveals the challenges that 
the regime met and the strategies that were deployed against the momentum that mass 
protests brought. This calculation of the process reveals what had determined the re-
construction of authoritarianism in Egypt.  
 
While the scope of the research ends with the military coup that took place in mid-2013, 
naming it as the restoration of the authoritarian rule in Egypt, the research does not 
propose that the process of contentious politics in Egypt is over. This particular period 
is taken into consideration as a single case in a single time frame (see: 1.2.2. for the 
selection of time period) for revealing the measures of authoritarian survival against a 
social movement that produced a hazard to the ruling regime in Egypt. The restored 
authoritarian rule today is the result of the mass movement that set off in 2011. 
  
Also, the study does not conclude with an evaluation that names the mass movement as 
a success or failure of but rather explores the gains versus the setbacks of the social 
movement consequently asking what were the setbacks of the movement that led to 
authoritarian reconstruction. In order to express these earnings and the setbacks the 
research uses qualitative research methods, primarily content analysis, systematic search 
of data to identify specific observable actions or characteristics. These observable 
actions are the key variables in the study.  
 
1.2.2. Selection of the Time Period 
The period taken into consideration in this research is aimed to reveal the impact of 
mass protest to authoritarian survival. The two-year cycle that led to the coup d’état 
needed examination because it was a process of unique societal mobilizations with 
large-scale reaction to political choices of the ruling elites. On the other hand, this time 
period was marked with non-stop contentious politics that urged the authoritarians to 
invent strategies to hold on to power. Each cycle determined the authoritarian learning 
of the next phase. The quest is to reveal the patterns in the period of contentious politics 
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starting with the first wave with the 18 days that led to Mubarak’s resignation; the 
interim period constituted the second wave of protests against the military rule which 
some called it the second revolution and the third wave that was marked with the first 
free elections in the history of modern Egypt and ultimately the military coup in mid-
2013. 
 
While the regime today uses various strategies to hold on to power, they defer from the 
ones considered in this research. After all the military coup of mid 2013 and after the 
presidential elections of 2014 that led to the presidency of the former defense minister 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the state of socio-political life in Egypt has been under worse 
condition than the Mubarak era as rights, liberties as every kind of contentious politics 
is heavily crushed by the government.  
 
After all, going back to 2011 this research proposes that the mass movement that 
brought down Hosni Mubarak in 18 days was a unique societal mobilization that was an 
intimidating threat to the authoritarian rule of the country. The course of 
authoritarianism had to be transformed after this unique societal event. While the 18 
days were crucial to determine the course of the waves to come, each wave was met 
with strategies used by the regime that were shaped by the dynamics of the previous 
one.  
 
1.2.3. Research Question  
 
Setting off with the intention to expose what the authoritarian rule did to contain such 
threats in this specific the study, with an integrated approach, the strategies of 
authoritarian survival in Egypt is revealed. Eventually, with its particular period and 
location, the driving question of this research is to explain how the popular uprising in 
Egypt forced the reconsideration of the familiarized explanations of authoritarian 
resilience. In order to disclose the reconstruction, the research asks: 
 
•   How did the collective action that constitutes a series challenge to the 
authoritarian regime ruling in Egypt, fail to overcome the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the country? 
•   How did the authoritarian regime in Egypt rebuild itself after the mass 
demonstrations that shifted the power structure within the ruling elite?   
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•   What does the mobilization practice mean for authoritarian survival in Egypt? 
•   What lessons can be learned about authoritarian reconstruction in the aftermath 
of the Egyptian Uprising? 
 
1.2.4 Content Analysis  
 
As this study is a historical analysis of an uprising and its aftermath, quantitative part of 
the study will deliver statistics about the scope protest activity in Egypt (number of 
strikes, causalities, arrests, percentage of representation in the parliament, etc.) within 
the studied period. In this research, already existing data are used. Thus, rather than a 
data collection process, the existing data are brought together and analyzed. Interviews 
are conducted with experts and actors to gain in-depth information about the waves of 
contentious politics.  
 
The analysis reveals how were the cycle formed, what was the characteristics of it and 
what did the protestors or the ruling elite learn in each cycle. To determine the 
boundaries and measures of authoritarian survival, the study benefits from the literature 
on authoritarian survival and contentious politics.  
 
Content Analysis is the primary tool to obtain data in the research. The strategy to 
identify actors with real influence and power through reputational method through 
interviews and the observations of interlocutors or experts.  In the process of content 
analysis mainstream, Egyptian Newspapers (Egypt Daily News, Al Masry-Al Youm, Al 
Akhbar, Egypt Independent, Al Ahram English) mainstream local newspapers and 
international broadcast media, (Al Jazeera, Guardian, The New York Times) are 
scanned.  
 
As a new arena to be investigated the texts written in social media spheres like 
Facebook and Twitter profiles of activists were crucial documents that were given a 
place in this research. Social media tools (social media sites like Twitter, Facebook, 
blogs,) speeches (Mubarak, SCAF officials, the opposition and Morsi) websites of 
political parties (Ikwanweb, Revolutionary Socialists) have become the leading content 
that formed the research.  
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On the other hand, official documents, reports from human rights organizations 
(Amnesty International, Cairo Institute for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch) 
and especially the work of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the research 
projects Tahrir Diaries, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) and 
Project on Middle East After the Arab Spring (POMEAS) were crucial resources to 
enhance this study.  
 
1.3.Literature Review  
 
1.3.1.   Social Movements Literature and Contentious Politics 
Studies of revolution/spring/social movement/uprising are more prone to historical 
explanations. These studies look at general social factors contributing to regime change 
which is generally by means of violence (Foran 1997; Skocpol 1994; Tilly 1993). 
Group formations within these mobilizations (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, 2013), 
policing responses of power (Grinberg, 2013), ‘collective identity creation’ in the 
squares (Talshir, 2012; Castells, 2012;) ‘direct democracy practices’ (Dhaliwal, 2012),  
‘democracy  from below’ (De Porta, 2014) interconnectedness of global struggles 
(Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, 2013) and economic prosperity and regime support 
(Magaloni and Wallace, 2008, Lynch 2012) have been some of the most discussed 
issues.  
 
Mobilizations after 2011 have been taken up under the topics of revolutions, riots, and 
resistance but has been a part of the broader literature on social movements. The social 
movements literature has various under titles and discussions but in the last decades the 
title ‘new social movements’ were mainly affiliated with non-violent movements gained 
importance with the uprisings in Eastern European countries in 2000s, Chile in 1989, 
South Africa in 1994, and the ‘colorful revolutions’ in Georgia 2003, Ukraine in 2004, 
Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the anti-austerity riots in Europe and the Arab Uprisings. Tarrow 
defined social movements as:  
sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on 
resonant collective action frames, and on the capacity to maintain sustained 
challenges against powerful opponents (Tarrow, 2011:7). 
 
They are not developed on their own, are ‘formed through complex encounters’ (Porta, 
1999: 257) with the inter communication of the challengers and authorities. (Tarrow, 
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2011).  In order to define the dynamic that arose in 2011, within the studies of ‘new’ or 
non-violent social movements, uprisings, Sidney Tarrow’s concept of ‘contentious 
politics’ is the broadest concept which covers all of the repertoires of collective action. 
Tilly defined the ‘repertoire of contention’ as ‘the ways that people act together in 
pursuit of shared interests.’ (Tilly, 1998: 41).  
 
Tarrow noted that contentious politics is ‘an interaction that is episodic, public, 
collective between the rulers and the ruled when; ‘at least one government is a claimant, 
an object of claims and the realization of the claims effects the interests of at least one 
of the claimants.’ (Tarrow, 2001:5).  
 
Setting off from the social movements literature to examine the uprisings of the Middle 
East and Egypt contentious politics derives support to define the popular movement that 
took place and to expresses the affiliation with authoritarian survival.  
 
According to Tilly, the ‘revolution5’ takes place when the interaction the government 
coercion does not work anymore. Simply this connotes to the lifting of the barrier of 
fear that was one of the mottoes in the Egyptian Uprising. After Tahrir, square 
occupations and forums in the squares or parks created a new repertoire of collective 
action and the squares became theaters when the barrier of fear was lifted. Contentious 
politics was formed with non-violent methods like student strike, boycott of social 
affairs, social disobedience, strikes, but the actual work of the organizers consisted of 
patching together provisional coalitions, suppressing risky tactics, negotiation with 
multiple agendas and finding public voice to collective action (Giugni, et.al, 1999). 
 
While the name revolution was used by the participants of the uprising, certain scholars, 
activists, etc. (Fadl, 2015, Alexander, 2013, De Smet, 2015) in the Egyptian example on 
the other hand, one crucial debate was whether the uprising in Egypt was a military 
takeover as Brown defined the fall of Mubarak as a military coup that came with public 
pressure  (Brown, 2012).  
                                                
5 In the research the word uprising is used to refer to the Egyptian case as a dictatorship collapse by mobilized 
political action. However, the word ‘revolution’ is accepted in various contexts to describe an authors or protestors 
perspective.  
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From the outlook of the research, the case in Egypt can be defined as a dictatorship 
collapse by mobilized political action. It was a revolutionary process but whether it suits 
the determinants of revolution or a coup is another area of research. By focusing on 
contentious, the research politics escapes the debate whether what happened was a 
revolution or not, but expresses that it is the dynamics/characteristics of the movement 
that had created an intereaction between the challengers and the authorities. In 
whichever name used the revolt/uprising/spring/revolution, not spring nor winter, not an 
event for a season but a dynamic process is a dynamic process with the interaction of 
various actors. As Tarrow pointed out: 
 
contentious politics occurs when ordinary people – often in alliance with more 
influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in a 
confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents. It is triggered when 
changing political opportunities, and constraints create incentives to take action 
for actors who lack resources on their own. People contend through known 
repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their 
margins. When backed by well-structured social networks and galvanized by 
culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to 
sustained interaction with opponents – to social movements (Tarrow, 2011:6).  
 
Driving from the literature of social movements the affinity among governments and 
primary actors is called regimes. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2007) Moreover, each 
regime has its own characteristics and as Tarrow proposes the departure in one case 
does not possess a generalized rule, an intangible law that works in all formulas of 
contention (Tarrow, 2011). 
 
From Tilly’s terms the power holders, participants and the subject populations 
accompanied by other parties are the constitutes of the social movement (Tilly, 1999). 
While coup d’etat and civil wars don’t count, a contentious movement is: ‘joint actions 
from activists, building alliances, struggling with competitors, mobilizing supporters, 
building collective identities, searching for resources and lobbying’ (Tilly, 1999: 257). 
 
The demands that come with the cycle of contention ‘by highlighting the vulnerability 
of authorities to contention challenge the interests of other contenders, either by 
claiming part of their resources or by attacking the interests of an established group 
directly’. (Tarrow, 2011). Therefore, the interaction determines the path of the cycle. 
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Collective actions usually innovate new repertoires, frames when power challenges 
them (Tarrow, 2011). The authoritarian counter attack becomes visible when the 
policing reactions of power become successful in dealing with these measures (this 
challenge of authority regarded as policing in the literature; repression, new legislation, 
bans, criminalization of the participants, etc.) the challengers are forced to invent new 
repertoires of action. As Grinberg discusses, policing can develop as a response to 
power against resistance, riots, and social movements. Both opponents socially learn 
how to act against each other. Thus, it creates a repertoire for both sides (Grinberg, 
2013).  
 
1.3.2. Authoritarian Survival  
 
Authoritarianism in its simplest definition is: ‘a political system which individual 
freedom is held as completely subordinate to the power or authority of the state, 
centered either in one person or a small group that is not constitutionally accountable to 
the people. 
 
Carrying off from the persistence of this political system where individuals are under 
subordination of the unaccountable, the authoritarian survival literature examines the 
sources and reasons of regime stability relatively to the likelihood of regime change. 
 
When slogans of the 2011 uprisings are investigated under light, it is revealed that all 
refer to the inner dynamics of enduring authoritarianism and to its shortcomings, which 
are at the center of social mobilization in the Arab World in 2011. For more than a 
decade studies on authoritarianism and authoritarian survival Heydemann, (2007), 
Heydemann and Leenders, (2012), Bellin (2004, 2012), Josua and Edel (2014), 
Anderson (2011), Lust, (2005), Gandhi and Przeworski, (2007), Droz-Vincent (2011), 
Valbjørn and Bank (2010), Ottoway (2010) searched how authoritarian systems 
continue their existence and suppress the actualities that threaten them.  
 
Authoritarian survival literature has been keen on explaining the reasons for the 
persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. While Valbjørn and Bank propose 
that democratization studies account for the region in a ‘linear path from 
authoritarianism’ (Valbjørn and Bank, 127:2010) that leans towards democratization, 
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studies of authoritarian survival argue that examining the mechanisms that permit its 
determination gives us a better account of the realities of the region. (Valbjørn and 
Bank, 2010). Aarts, Kolman, Statema, Dahhan, point out: 
 
if we wish to understand the variation in autocracies and why some are better 
than others in sustaining survival strategies, we should analyze how 
authoritarian rulers perceive the threats they face and which institutional, social, 
political, and ideological conditions influence such threats (Aarts, et.al., 
2012:13). 
 
In their recent work Aras and Falk (2015) examine the reaction of authoritarian regimes 
in the MENA region by revealing the shifting alliances in regional policies while Bellin 
(2004, 2012) focusing on the uniqueness of each democratization process underlines the 
military’s capacity and decision ‘to shoot or not to shoot at the protestors’ remains one 
of the crucial aspects for collective action to form its path and authoritarians to survive. 
 
Hinnebusch (2006, 2015) on the other hand, investigates state formations, and the 
structures which he proposes are responsible for the authoritarian survival in the Middle 
East. In his recent work (2015) in order to find observable trajectories, he looks at the 
role of mass mobilization -if it possesses cross-class coalitions or not-, opportunity 
structures, regime capacity, the role of bureaucracy, political economy, external 
intervention and the role of a transitional coalition for reconstruction of authority in 
different cases. Stancer (2012) on the other hand, by focusing on the capacity of 
flexibility of the regimes examines political structures, alliances of elites, institutions, 
and ‘governance in Egypt and Syria because ‘even in successful revolutions they are 
seldom renounced’.  
 
The literature on the breakdown of authoritarianism and transition processes prioritizes 
authoritarian learning rather democratic contagion. In the quest for grasping the 
dynamics what Heydemann and Leenders (2012) answer is that how the regimes come 
around to the massive threats that mass mobilization poses for regime survival. Apart 
from the dominance of coercion, their study encompasses dynamics of military 
defection; the logic of social mobilization; and the complementary roles of structure, 
intention, and protest which can be examined under political uprisings.  
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In order to pass the wave of protests, discontent, and regain legitimacy, regimes attain 
strategies to stay in power. These strategies as Heydemann and Leenders name counter-
revolutionary as well (2012) are not simply defensive or reactive.  
As they point out: 
they are complex, multilevel games involving regimes, publics, and external actors, in 
which regimes develop strategies that aim to affect the strategic calculus of citizens, 
allies, and adversaries, even while constantly updating their own probabilities, both of 
successfully suppressing their opponents and, should this become unlikely, negotiating 
the terms of their departure from office (Heydemann and Leenders, 2012:83).  
 
However, in the quest for grasping the dynamics, it is crucial to investigate how the 
regimes adapt to the challenges that mass uprisings pose. (See: Table 1 for the variety of 
the tactics of Heydemann & Leenders, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   Souce: Heydemann & Leenders, 2012 
 
 
Nonetheless, the strategies are not led in a day, and structural reasons account for the 
capacity for authoritarian survival. Bellin’s classification of authoritarianism supports 
Heydemann and Leenders’s (2012) which are; ‘the financial power of autocratic 
structures with receiving support from international networks’, which becomes an 
existential necessity to hold on combined with ‘low levels of institutionalization and 
weak capacity for societal mobilization’ (Bellin, 2012). These shared characteristics of 
authoritarian regimes determine its survival too. Another crucial tactic for the survival 
of authoritarianism according to Lynch is: 
 
regimes adapt strategies to prevent the emergence of internal splits within the 
ruling coalitions and their key support bases. They can be the defection of 
militaries, like increasing the salaries of armed forces, hand-outs to the regime 
constituencies. (Lynch, 2012:83) 
 
On the other hand, Sharp’s research contributes to the authoritarian survival literature as 
it examines the weakness’ that dictatorships face. While he points out that unity which 
Table 1: Authoritarian Survival Tactics of Heydemann and Leenders 
 
1. Intervention from regional or international actors 
2. Sectarianism discourse 
3. Strategic use of violence 
4. Acceptable exit strategies 
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is attained with non-violence6 remain crucial for a social movement to succeed, he 
points out that internal institutional conflicts within the regime followed with the 
possibility of distinctive agenda by the military may end up in its collapse. (Sharp, 
2009: 89) Apart from the weaknesses of dictatorships if we return to Tilly (2006) again, 
the threatening mass mobilization which he bases as strengths of mass mobilization 
driving from his description of contentious politics contains; worthiness, unity,  
numbers, and commitment (Tilly, 2006:53). 
 
1.3.3. Protest and Authoritarian Survival 
 
Protests7 are not desired for authoritarian regimes, but sometimes inevitable. They are 
crucial in the literature of authoritarian survival because they can determine the survival 
of regimes as Magaloni and Wallace (2008: 27) refer by ‘affecting the probabilities of 
coups, elite splits and factional politics at the top of the regime.’ Regime threatening 
mobilization, in its short connotation protest as Lipsky (1965) defines is ‘a political 
resource used by those who do not have direct access to policy making to mobilize 
influential public opinion.’ As the main act of the non-violent resistance, protests as 
their part in a social movement are ‘a collective challenge to elite authorities by 
significant number of people with common purpose and solidarity’ (Durac, 2013: 45).  
 
As protests cause authoritarian instability, it triggers the authoritarian learning process. 
They emerge as an important variable as it threats the regime and gains the capacity of 
collective mobilization (Haynes, 1997).  
 
Tullock’s formulation of the potential sources of danger for dictatorships encompassed 
a genuine popular uprising. (Tullock, 2005) Magaloni and Wallace’s research 
investigate the relationship between mass politics and political survival by setting off 
from the question ‘how much political survival is threatened by protest and 
demonstrations’ followed by ’what can determine their capacity to resist or collapse’? 
Their research concludes that in order for a regime to survive it has to be supported with 
what they call citizen loyalty backed up with its ruling coalition, and armed forces  
                                                
6 The Arab Uprisings were categorized as non-violent social movements. For a detailed account on tactics that are 
used in non-violent social movements see: Sharp (2012) at Appendix 1. 
7 Protest activity can be signing petitions, boycott, strikes, occupation of buildings, 
	  
 
 
20	  
(Magaloni & Wallace, 2008) so in order for a movement to success the ruling coalition 
has to be convinced and the subversive coalitions dropped  (Magaloni & Wallace, 
2008).   
 
On Magaloni and Wallace’s account citizens are obedient to an authoritarian rule is 
because as individuals they don’t have the capacity to transform or terminate it. 
(Magaloni and Wallace, 2008) Though when protests integrate with the public into a 
social movement and creates new areas, memories, and the most courage.  
 
Protest occur when citizens are dissatisfied. So when a group is dissatisfied or deprived 
as Gurr points out (1970), a riot will be aimed at changing their well-being by 
transforming the political and economic structures, and forcing government action. If 
the ruling class can balance the deprivation, they survive the wave.   
 
Grinberg (2013) enters into the debate with his concept of ‘movement of resistance’. 
Resistance is understood as a reaction to authoritarian politics that if only participants 
share some understandings and identities, the authorities can be threatened; they can 
form an identity with resistance. Shared interests during the time of political events 
bring them together. However, strength and popularity of contention lead to changes 
within these group formations. A movement of resistance emerge against power when 
two conditions coexist; as a marginalized, discriminated group have no space to express 
themselves, and dominant group’s political mechanisms to prevent marginalized 
group’s representation is weakened or removed. When these conditions exist, 
marginalized group, seek to gain recognition and representation to its claims. They 
protest against the dominant power including opposition groups as well by accusing 
them to be failed on their representation too. However, a movement of resistance is not 
a cycle because when the moment ends political power reacts to prevent a new cycle. 
Grinberg calls this moment a counter-movement. He argues that movement of 
resistance has unintended consequences instead of desired ones in most of the cases 
(Grinberg, 2013).  
 
Protest can create divisions between the ruling elites and reveal true preferences of the 
participants of the social movement.  As Giugini writes, they can: 
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 produce political change with ‘altering the power relations between challengers 
and authorities; by forcing policy change; and by provoking broader and usually 
more durable systemic changes, both on the structural and cultural levels 
(Giugini, 1999, xii).  
 
So protests can create a culture of resistance that can end or harm the legitimacy of the 
regime. Porta underlines a crucial point that there has been a change in the shared 
conception of legitimate ways to protest as well as a legitimate way for the state to 
control the protest. (Porta, 1999:66) As protest turn to squares for the quest for rights, 
the protestors gain legitimacy by imposing political pressure on the regime. It is an 
effective, challenging strategy because as Chenoweth and Stephan point out: 
 
by raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo higher levels of 
participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success 
including enhanced resilience higher probabilities of tactical innovation 
expanded civic disruption (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:10). 
 
One of the outputs of the protests is the new, creative slogans, songs, slogans, artwork 
creating what Durac (2013) calls ‘emotive national symbols’ and most importantly as 
Fournier (2014) underlines protests create belonging to the social movement, a goal, 
motivation and identity. The regime has the use of force, but the protestors only possess 
the advantage of numbers, creating masses, capturing a location. This location creates 
an ethical superiority which has been the cases of the ‘Friday Demonstrations’ that set 
off from mosques.  
 
1.3.4. Repression and Authoritarian Survival  
 
When a regime is met with a challenge, the responses range from accommodation to 
suppression. However, the most widely reported aspect of authoritarian rule is coercion; 
understood as the regime’s ability to use or the capacity to attain force. 
So what happens when regimes use repression and why do they use it? Repression is a 
tool for stability and survival but repression alone is not sufficient to understand the 
dynamics of a given protest. So authoritarian survival explores why there is a use of 
repression and when.   
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Josua and Edel define repression as ‘the sum of all strategies employed by the elites to 
contain the challenges.’ (Josua & Edel, 2014) As elites give a wider repertoire of 
strategies besides repression at their disposal survival strategies aim to contain 
challenges. Therefore, the nature of the challenges determines the choice of strategies 
and available options. (Josua & Edel, 2014:6) Why do some regimes choose to repress, 
some do not and which repressive measures are utilized, when and why depends on 
each case.  
When the mass movement makes repression harder Bellin says that regime survival 
turns on the military and ‘its willingness and capacity to bring in the tanks, the heavy 
weapons, and the men in numbers significant enough to contain a mass uprising’ 
(Bellin, 2012).  However, it becomes selective to shoot or not to shoot therefore it is 
important to investigate authoritarian survival strategies as Albrecht names ‘beyond 
coercion’ (Albrecht, 2005).  
Bourdieu (2005) distinguishes between ‘excessive state violence’ that occurs after weak 
social challenges and surprising state tolerance towards formidable challenges. As he 
notes ‘contentious challenges may undercut modes of state power, legitimize or inspire 
other difficulties to which authorities cannot respond’ (Bourdieu, 2005:35). So in order 
to grasp the strategies to re-build hegemony one has to bear in mind the usage of 
selective violence and that in the protests there can be a contentious change of the use of 
repression with a check and balance, a learning process. The elites/authorities who have 
control of the state apparatus can decide that using oppression is less healthful 
movement.   
 
1.5 Square Occupations 
Described as ‘resistance in daily life through squares’ by Bayat (2013) square 
occupations and encampments for days or weeks are the novel character of the 
movements since 2011. Previously ‘reclaim the streets’ movement beginning from 1991 
occupied streets and highways, WTO protests held the streets in Seattle in 1999, Global 
Justice Movement and stop war coalitions occupied streets and squares even in Egypt in 
2003. However, none of them stayed there for days and established collective 
management of occupied space and forums.  
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One of the main characteristics of the occupations is that it takes places in the centers of 
urban centers. Wallace argued that urbanness challenged authoritarian rule because: 
 
protests in the capital are more likely to be observed by regime insiders, the 
masses, foreigners and is harder to disperse than multiple smaller protests in 
many different places that add up to the same population of protestors. (Wallace, 
2013:638) 
 
As Chenoweth and Stephan argued, the solidarity and the humor that the protestors 
construct helps to break the fear that authoritarian system is build up upon. ‘Courage 
breeds courage’ as square politics provide massiveness as higher numbers of turn out 
promote the success of a contentious movement resulting inloyalty shifts,  (Chenoweth 
& Stephan, 2011) mainly within the opponents or members of the security forces. 
 
On the other hand, Castells (2013) names the occupiers as communities. For Castells 
social movements occur at a symbolic location with the formation of independent 
communities against the political institutions. Communities depend on unity. The 
invaded locations (some places of symbolic force compromise of financial institutions, 
parliament buildings, party headquarters and squares8) are a direct symbolic force 
against the rulers.  
 
While Bowen was referring the Midan as ‘the Paris Commune was reborn 140 years 
later in the narrow streets around Tahrir Square’ (Bowen, 2013:8) the free people’s 
republic of Tahrir was used in various chants. He tells that the existence of 
demonstrators in the square made the protestors feel like they were owning the city. 
(Bowen, 2013) Chabot and Sharifi point out that the occupation of the Tahrir Square led 
to the creation of communities that worked daily on cleaning, media coverage and 
preparing nonviolent direct action campaigns. Primarily the Tahrir Square and other 
public spaces were the reflection of an alternative way of life and confronting 
authorities (Chabot &Sharifi, 2012).  
 
 
 
                                                
8 Historically important invasions mark the 1871 Paris Commune, 1915 Glasgow strikes, etc. 
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1.6 Authoritarian Learning 
Authoritarian survival enters a cycle which is conducted with a counter reaction to the 
challenge named as ‘authoritarian learning’ for authoritarian regimes to re-shape their 
policies. (Heydemann, 2007) According to challenges the authoritarians adapt 
themselves to the new conditions. Named as authoritarian learning, the adaptations 
become a result of ‘domestic and external resources that define any given regime’s 
‘opportunity set’ (Heydemann, 2013: 65).  
 
Stancer (2012) names the learning process as ‘adaptation’ and defines it as a political 
change in a state that comes along with the changes in its environment by containing 
power at the expense of the unity of the elites.  The nature of the protests and the 
strength of the protesters effect response (Josua & Edel, 2014:6) but depend on the 
respective regime.  
 
However, in the quest for grasping authoritarian learning in the Middle East, 
Heydemann categorizes some common authoritarian learning characteristics 
(Heydemann, 2013: 66) that are observable in the cases of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
 
Table 2: Heydemann’s Common Authoritarian Learning 
Characteristics in MENA 
 
1. Appropriating and containing civil societies 
2. Managing political contestation 
3. Capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms 
4. Controlling new communications technologies 
5. Diversifying international linkages 
 
Source: Heydemann, 2007  
 
Naming them as ‘hybrids’ Heydemann (2007) concludes that the Arab regimes combine 
repression, regulation, and co-optation, adopt NGO functions of the state to control civil 
society so it cannot challenge the regime. 
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1.7 The Role of Authoritarian Institutions in Regime Survival 
 
Prezowski and Gandhi (2007) underline the role of institutions in the context 
authoritarian regimes and highlight that autocrats institutionalize through consultative 
councils, juntas, and political bureaus to stay in power longer (Prezowski and Gandhi, 
2007).   
 
Political institutions are considered the most durable ingredient of opportunity 
structures. They operate in a way that various groups within a society cannot challenge 
the ruling coalition. As Kriesi and Wisler indicate the mode of institutional oppression 
tends to narrow preferences in so the thought of any political alternative of rule is just 
impossible (Kriesi &Wisler, 1999: 42).  
 
The relation of mass movement with authoritarian institutions is best defined by Josua 
and Edel as: ‘regime characteristics influence the government from above and interact 
with the factors from below, namely the characteristics of the challenge that threatens 
stability’ (Josua and Edel, 2014:3). 
 
Stancer, (2009) points out that any consideration of the causes and the consequences of 
protest and political opposition require an assessment on the monopoly of the most 
powerful institution; state. (Stancer, 2009) This is because: ‘the nature and the 
effectiveness of opposition are not determined primarily not by the actor’s inherent 
characteristics, but by the state to which it is reacting' (2009:6).  
 
Springborg alike points out that consideration of the causes of protest and political 
opposition require an assessment on the monopoly of power of the state. (Springbourg, 
2009). This is because the nature and the effectiveness of opposition are determined 
primarily not by the actor’s inherent characteristics, but by the state to which it is 
reacting. As Waldner (1999) emphasizes the origins of institutions determine which 
elites are included and how elite consensus is reached.  
 
On the other hand, according to Ambrosio (2014) the structural characteristics of the 
state, its effective rule are the key determinants of regime survival. He suggests that 
authoritarian survival is sustained with the capacity of the government to embed itself to 
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the changing dynamics. He argues that:  
having inclusive institutions in place to respond to the needs and interests of 
societal forces creates a more stable foundation for any regime’s continued rule 
– something just as true in autocracies as it is in a democracy (Ambrosio, 
2014:484). 
Apart from their capacity in learning, the usage of repression when and in which scale is 
directly linked to the role of authoritarian institutions as regimes depend on them to 
serve their security needs. (like the ones Bellin (2012) sets as the military branches, 
intelligence agencies, police, and a praetorian guards). 
 
For example, the adaptations of the Assad regime in Syria were different from Egypt 
with its capacity and willingness to use repression or the tactics what Heydemann 
emphasizes as using a sectarian hard-liner rhetoric and using institutionalized repressive 
exclusionary habits (Heydemann, 2013: 67) because the formation of institutional actors 
is different. For instance, while Mubarak’s departure did not mean a disengagement for 
the state’s capacity to rule in Libya Gaddafi’s departure itself meant the dissolution of 
the state. 
 
Pepinsky (2008) conversely points out that political conditions rather than institutions 
are at the heart of authoritarian survival and that institutions are tools of durable 
regimes, not determinants of them (Pepinsky, 2008: 17). However, he doesn’t deny their 
role in understanding their function in regime survival but doesn’t find it necessarily 
sufficient.  
 
1.8 Success or Failure of Social Movements 
When scores of people in the main sectors of society stop obeying and engage in 
prolonged acts of social, political and economic disruption they may 
fundamentally alter the relationship between the ruler and ruled (Chenoweth 
&Stephan, 2011). 
 
However, naming this transformation as a success or failure can be deceiving due to its 
complex outcomes, different contexts and the demands of particular movements. Setting 
off from this complexity studies of social movements, revolutions, uprisings question 
the measuring of success as labeling victory is highly compelling. With another 
terminology Josua and Edel (2014) use change and continuity to explain the 
transformations that come with a particular social movement.  
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According to Jack Goldstone, there are four crucial elements that have to coincide for a 
revolution to succeed. They are: 
…a government that seems so irreversibly unjust that it is commonly believed to 
be a threat to the country’s future; elites, especially in the military, must feel 
alienated from the regime and no longer prefer to defend it; a majority of the 
population, including different ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic 
classes, must mobilize; international powers must either constrain a government 
from using all possible means to defend itself or refuse to interfere and defend the 
government in power. (2011: 9) 
However, a transfer from one elite to another may not be the determinant of success. It 
might lead to the dismissal of one particular group but can end up in the tyranny of the 
other. One backlash can be the Iranian Revolution; that was a success for some but a 
failure for the other.  
 
As Giugini defines social movements compose of mixed up organizations, and aims 
their final destination can possess different strategies and desires  (Giugini, 1999). So 
success or failure becomes extremely relevant. Somaia says that (2010) to calculate the 
latitude of a social movement whether it has been a success or a failure depends on its 
ability to impose its own agenda on the political regime. Therefore, what is determining 
to understand success or a failure of a campaign must be traced from the fact that 
whether there is a shift in power between the ones resisting and the opposer (Chenoweth 
&Stephan, 2011: 58).  
 
Goldstone’s second point that the alienation of the elites underscores the armed forces 
alienation from regime for a movement to succeed can be articulated Bellin’s (2004) 
proposal that the vastness and impact of the coercive apparatus hinder social 
mobilizations in the Middle East and (2004: 27) the responses of the military is a 
determinant fact for success. Nonetheless, as a large scaled participated movement with 
tactical and strategic aims can overcome the opposing forces (Chenoweth & Stephan, 
2011:61), but the end may not be democratization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PROTEST ACTIVITY IN EGYPT 
 
2.1 Contentious Politics in Egypt 
Recent history of the Middle East is littered with examples of strikes, opposition 
movements, bread riots setting off in the 1970s in Egypt and Jordan, military operations 
like the Hama Massacre in Syria in1982, the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the 1990s, the uprisings at the North of Iraq against the Baath Party in 1991 followed 
by more recent ones like the Syrian reform movement in 2005, Lebanon in 2009, the 
Green Movement in Iran in 2009.  Therefore, it has always been in the center or near the 
land that has been unsettled for various internal and external reasons.  
 
In such chaotic turmoil region, Egypt has never been away from street protests. 
Therefore, the uprising on 25th of January, too, was neither the first nor the last revolt 
in Egyptian history. From the start of 2000s, Tahrir Square in Cairo, considered the 
heart of Egypt, has been home to solidarity protests with Palestinian Intifada in 2000, 
anger over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the gathering of the judges in 2006 (Alexander 
&, Bassiouny, 2014:98) and various labor movements.  
 
What distinguishes the recent mobilization of 2011 was that it was challenging the 
regime for the first time with the masses united around one single aim. According to 
Saif, (2011) the movements portrayed collective action that came from ‘bottom up’ 
differing from various other social movements under the oppression of 
authoritarianism’ (Saif, 2011).  
 
In the last decade during and aftermath of the flawed elections held in 2005 and 2010, 
the demands of labor were crucial for mobilization and formation of new social groups 
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and movements. According to Hamzawy (2005), the protestors were perceived as a 
threat, though not significant enough as they were unable to mobilize the cogent 
segments of the society. As he underlines the protests in 2005 were sit-ins not marches 
as the police would not let the protesters pass and the crowd of protestors was not big 
enough to be able to break the security forces. Yet, in 2011, it was, which ushered a 
new era for Egypt. 
 
2.1.1. From Nasser to Sadat: The Origins of ‘Revolutionary Egypt.' 
Cook (2012) on the modern Egyptian regime states that:  
There were moments when the regime and its defenders enjoyed tremendous popular 
support, but it always managed to maintain through a combination of bribery and, 
importantly, coercion (2012:226). 
 
The Mubarak presidency, which was toppled down on January 25th 2011, had its origins 
in the coup d’état that had toppled King Farouk of Egypt and brought the Free Officers 
to power in 1952. Named as the Revolution of 1952, the Free Officers moved to power 
after the historic clash with the British forces that cost the lives of 40 soldiers leading to 
an unrest among Egyptians costing more lives and causing more anger. After the coup, 
the military announced that there would be a passage to a parliamentary system, 
following which is a well-known figure Mohammad Naguib was chosen as the head of 
state, becoming the first President of the Republic.  
 
The parliamentary system was a target never to be reached.  In 1953 while the 
monarchy was abolished, Naguip too resigned giving the leadership to the popular name 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite the fact that the military intervention was conducted with 
the popular support of the people, the new regime was neither ready nor confident for 
contestation. The new administration banned political parties, even executed labor 
activists Mostafa Khamis and Mohammad Hasan el-Bakary responsible for factory riots 
against the officers (Montado, 2013). In this era when the administration was trying to 
build itself on durable grounds and gain trusted allies, the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Wafd were the only groups to survive the crackdown as Cook mentions (Cook, 2012).   
 
The regime of popular support was born through the Egyptian national struggle 
powered by the rhetoric of independence advocating freedom from first from British 
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rule, then the legacies of the military take-over of 1952, Suez Crisis of 1956 and the 
conflict with Israel. The Nasser era, named ‘Arab Socialism’, marked a closer relation 
with Soviets, in some contexts focused on spending large sums of money on welfare 
and profiting people working on the land. (Owen and Pamuk, 1998)  
 
Outside, the military enjoyed aids from the Soviet Union in the era, but stayed as a 
representative of the Non-Aligned Movement that posed a midway in the Cold War. 
Inside, the military regime with a statist Soviet-style planned economic programme 
pursued land reform policies that benefited the peasants, gave workers job security 
making it harder for the bosses to fire employees. (Cook, 2012: 73) It was not fond of 
strikes. As Kandil puts forward, the consensus of the regime was built as: ‘the regime 
offered free education, employment in an expanding public sector, affordable 
healthcare, cheap housing and other forms of social protection, in return for obedience.’ 
(Kandil, 2011)  
 
The masses were in fact obedient with some ‘flaws’ that could be taken down. The 
regime was enjoying mass popularity but was by all means authoritarian. While 
political opposition was non-existent, the Emergency Law that drove from the colonial 
legacy was attained by the military rule primarily in 1958. The law gave the 
government extraordinary powers under a state of emergency, which continued to exist 
in the Mubarak Era).  
 
The age of Nasser was when Egypt was perceived as the big brother of the Arab World. 
As contentious movements against the colonial powers were on the agenda, he became 
the face of the Arab cause (Cook, 2012:72). Even though the 1967 war with Israel was 
lost in solely six days, Nasser was still loved and respected, preserving his reputation in 
the Arab world. 
 
With Nasser’s death in 1970, Sadat opened a new page in Egyptian politics. After the 
defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the peace agreement with Israel was on the 
horizon. He went to a change of figures and removed the pro-Soviet sentiments in the 
administration and turned his face to the US and the liberalization of markets. One of 
the greatest changes that came with Sadat was his famous/infamous infitah policy.  
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Intifah, meaning opening in Arabic, had two layers: first enhanced relation with the US 
and the second the ‘opening’ of the economy. The policy challenging their previous 
privileges and social protection primarily upset the peasants that had a stake in the 
established system.  
 
Lippman explains the results of Sadat’s policies as the following: 
 
…while Sadat gained international prestige as a result of his peace treaty with 
Israel, he remained disliked at home. The peace treaty brought no immediate 
benefits to the Egyptian people, and Sadat’s liberal economic reforms caused 
massive discontent. His decision to make peace with Israel isolated Egypt from 
the other Arab countries, worsening his approval ratings throughout the region. 
By the time of his assassination, Sadat was viewed as a visionary abroad but 
reviled and alienated in Egypt (Lipman , 2016).  
 
While with the Camp David Peace deal Egypt enjoyed recognition and support from the 
US, recognizing Israel meant a transformation of the role of Egypt as a regional leader 
creating repercussions in the Arab world like suspending Egypt from the Arab League 
and moving the headquarters to Tunisia. Inside, there was a castigation, too. 
 
The structural amendments that primarily proposed the end of state subsidies on 
nutrition triggered the 1977 events, named as the ‘bread riots’. The anger ended leaving 
seventy-nine dead more than five hundred injured. The army re-established the food 
subsidies to contain the protests. Two years later, Sadat was assassinated by Khalid 
Islambouli, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, affiliated with al-Qaeda. His death 
led to the creation of a new tool for the regime to oppress; the fear of Islamism (Cook, 
2012). 
 
2.1.2. From Mubarak Era to Present Day 
The death of Sadat paved the way for Hosni Mubarak to become the fourth president of 
Modern Egypt. What Mubarak did primarily was to pursue the intifah policy with 
oppression at home and conduct negotiations for loans abroad. In response to Camp 
David deal, the military enjoyed large amounts of aid from the US.  
 
While Islamists were the primary group to be oppressed, all opposition parties got their 
share. After Sadat’s era, there was a sweeping oppression and no tolerance to Islamist 
and other movements with an increased securitization of the state. All publications of 
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the opposition groups were outlawed and religious centers were taken under the state 
supervision (Cook, 153:2012). The emergency law prevailed while the role of the 
president was strengthened.  
 
According to Blaydes, Egypt under Mubarak was ‘a paradoxical combination of an 
autocratic regime and competitive elections in ‘semi-authoritarianism’.  As Cook points 
out, Egypt as a country ‘remained largely poor, authoritarian, and dependent on a global 
power’ (Cook, 2012:133). 
 
According to Holgar (2005), Mubarak’s survival was dependent on keeping the 
military’s privileged position as the regime could ‘never totally ignore any group or 
stratum of society that might come to pose a serious challenge’ (2005:384). However, 
the hegemonic place of the army was changing in practice as security measures were 
transformed giving more power to Central Security Forces and from time to time the 
baltagiya which are the infamous gangs to deal with the discontent. The military was 
not on the political scene but remained as a chief partner to the ruling class and an ally 
to the regime. 
Nasser’s ‘Arab Socialism’ in some contexts had focused on spending large sums of 
money on welfare (Owen and Pamuk, 1999). Intifah was a crucial step to open Egyptian 
markets to the international arena and alter the foundations that modern Egypt is based 
on. With the implementation of the IMF plan, as Stacher (2012) points out, the 
transition to neoliberalism occurred through adapting authoritarian structure that the 
newly emerging elites would benefit from. The Mubarak regime abandoned the 
previous policy of providing guaranteed employment in the state sector for those with 
university or intermediate degrees (Owen and Şevket, 1999) which upset the middle 
classes and the educated youth.  
 
In his era the elite extended to successful businessman, influential family clean heads as 
senior bureaucrats. While the rich got richer, the pact hit the ones that worked in the 
land. The subsequent clashes over land disputes left 100 farmers dead in 1997 (Baydes, 
2010). There were also occasional unrests in various cities but they were not big enough 
to challenge the regime. However, the consensus that was driven by the redistributive 
mechanisms was coming to an end.  
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The late 2000s was marked by the increase in food prices with the lack of any food 
subsidy causing more deprivation. The Egyptian economy had grown from about 4 
percent in 2004 to 7 percent in 2008, but 40 percent of Egyptians live on less than $2 a 
day today. Furthermore, the reduced rate in oil-producing countries of the Gulf caused 
the return of migrants to Egypt with no jobs and lack of satisfaction in the social status. 
Additionally, in 2010 food prices rose by 21 percent (Bowen, 2013) accompanied by 
the lack of jobs provided for the 700,000 young people that were joining Egypt’s 
workforce every year. As Bowen noted only around 30,000 new jobs were available per 
year (Bowen, 6:2013). With such figures, an public unrest was inevitable. 
With economic hardship, the emergency rule prevailed and allowed Mubarak to hang 
down rights and liberties, censorship on the media, and imprisonment of the opposition 
when necessary (Kraetzschmar & Cavatorta, 2010).  
2.1.3. 2005 Elections: A Turning Point?  
 
In 2005, with the pressure from Western countries that the regime was cooperating 
with, Mubarak passed a new presidential election law that paved the way to the first 
multi-contested elections in Egyptian history. Named as the 2005 reforms, it was the 
first time that the opposition could organize and compete publicly and legally. 
 
The 2005 Reforms occurred in a period when civil society grew not because the state 
retreated, but because authoritarian incumbents deployed a new tactic of control. Thus, 
they could reassert power and slake dissension by granting concessions too mild to 
produce systemic change. By calling it a calculated survival strategy Yom points out 
that: 
Arab autocrats promoted reforms that encourage political competition and 
liberal opposition; but when civil discord becomes a viable threat, the state de-
liberalizes, retracting its indulgence and intensifying repression until anti-regime 
sentiment has abided (2005:23). 
 
However, despite promising free elections, Mubarak took steps to prevent any potential 
rise of opposition when it became clear that the opposition could change the balances.  
NDP cloistered entrance to polling sites where the opposition was strong, opened fire on 
voters, stuffed ballot boxes and later on arrested the candidates. Therefore, to ‘correct’ 
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the election results were one of the strategies that Mubarak used to stay in power. 
Naming it as electoral violence Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta state that:  
 
While including force selectively, on the other hand, the regime would further 
undermine the regime’s legitimacy at home and built on the fear of Islamism 
and stability internationally. In the end, the regime opted for what it must have 
perceived as the lesser of two dangers to authoritarian survival, cracking down 
harshly on the Muslim Brotherhood, its candidates and sympathizers 
(Kraetzschmar & Cavatorta, 2010:330). 
 
Apart from the fraud elections with the start of the 2000s, Egyptians began to mobilize 
in town squares. Yet, the ‘new era’ in Egyptian politics can be traced back to 2004 
when the first series of demonstrations under the Kefaya (Enough) Movement set off. 
This was united with the crucial strikes of 2004 rising in 2005 in to 202, 222 in 2006 
and 614 in 2007 (Naguib, 2011).  
Though there were slogans for their Arab fellows, Mubarak, and the regime was not 
under direct target. In the 2000s social movements blossomed in Egypt. Kefaya was 
crucial as it gathered different opposition groups together ranging from leftist, pro-
Nasser groups, Islamists, and liberals. It used the method of civil disobedience and went 
to the squares without taking permission from the officials. As Shehata underline the 
crowd protested, chanted slogans denouncing ‘the president, his family, and the security 
establishment’ (Shehata, 2010) but did not call for the end of the regime. The Intifada, 
Iraq War were the major events that united Egyptians to demonstrate and express 
themselves on public spheres focusing at their deprivations as well.  
 In an in-depth interview Mahmoud Makade, from Tomorrows Youth Liberal 
Organization stated that:  
‘First, there was a ritual for protesting at important dates. In the 2000s, at 9th of April 
2003 when American invaded Iraq, it was the first time when Egyptian people protested 
against the regime. This was the first time after 1952 they started to chant against the 
head of government9’.  
 
On April 6, 2008, a loose coalition of Mahalla and Kafr Al-Dawwar textile workers 
coordinated general strike and a national day of protest to demand a minimum wage and 
end to the corruption of police brutality (Ghobashy, 2012:25). When the movement 
                                                
9 Interview with Mahmoud Makade. 9 March, 2015. 
	  
 
 
35	  
proved that it was durable and resistant, it was first met with repression; yet, the 
emerging negotiations resulted in a resolution, not as much as the workers wanted but 
they received a forty-five-day bonus and profit sharing (Cook, 2012:179). The 
concession were made because the movement was joined by thousands of people. While 
the workers ended up getting enhanced conditions, the crucial outcome was the birth of  
6th of April movement, a solidarity campaign that encompassed different social bases 
and worked grassroots. 
 
Apart from regional uneasiness the main cause of the mass discontent in Egypt was the 
economy. The Egyptian economy was growing from about 4 percent in 2004 to 7 
percent in 2008 but more than 40 percent of Egyptians were living on less than $2 a 
day. As Jack Shenker states the rich got richer in Egypt while the life in the shanty 
towns was dreadful with the deprivation of one of the most basic needs; water (Shenker, 
2009). 
 
In the 2000s, the businessman emerged as politicians, and figures like Mubarak’s son 
Gamal exemplified the inequality within the country. The newly appointed rich 
businessman deputies like Ahmed Ezz, owner of the biggest steel company of the 
country was causing frustration in the public. In contrast to old Egypt born in Nasserist 
grounds that glorified being an Egyptian and provided jobs and lands for its people, the 
injustices were becoming apparent. The emergence of these new elite did not please the 
military, either, as the privatization process could hamper their economic privileges. 
 
Another significant change of the Mubarak era was the growth of the internal security 
and intelligence. Egypt was transforming from a military state to a police one. Almost 
every protesting sector had experienced police brutality (Sowers & Toensing, 2012) but 
as Ghobashy (2012) points out none of them were able to shift the balance of resources 
in their benefit. This was due to the discrepancy of the opposition.  
 
When 2005 parliamentary elections took place ending with fraud due to Mubarak’s fear 
that he could lose the majority, there was no gathering big enough to challenge the 
injustice. The opposition, as fragmented as it was, was not strong enough to throw a 
blow to the Mubarak regime.  
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However, Kefaya, 6th of April and the contention at the beginning of the decade were 
among the first clues that showed the stronger challenge to the regime would come from 
the matrix of established political organizations. There were contention and 
organization after another rigged elections of Mubarak in 2010 parliamentary elections. 
In order to repudiate the legitimacy of his rule, National Association for Change formed 
a shadow parliament peoples’ assembly with 120 representatives that included the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Fahmi, 2012). 
Copts were under more pressure just before the uprising on November as the start of the 
month in Southern Egypt some Muslim groups burned down houses of Copts because ‘a 
Muslim woman had an affair with a Christian man’ while the security failed to stop the 
destruction from occurring. (‘Egyptian Coptic Christians revolt over halted church-
building’, 2010). Weeks later the police with the order by the municipality stopped the 
construction of a church in Cairo by violent means that resulted in a death of a citizen. 
This was followed by the New Year Bombing at Alexandria at the Saint Mark and Pope 
Peter church that took the life of 34 citizens.    
When the dates were ticking to 2010, the discontent had reached its final point. The 
killing of a young boy called Khaled Said from Alexandria in June 2010 under police 
custody sparked anger. In an in-depth interview Ahmed Emad Hamdy, a resident of 
Alexandria was saying that:  
Khaled Said was someone that everyone had a sympathy too. He was one of us. 
He was killed when trying to reach home, and the government lied about him. 
They said he took drugs but later we learned that he was tortured to death. His 
death was one of the reasons I joined the protests.10 
Khaled Said was the Bouazizi of Egypt, but his immediate death had not caused mass 
protests. However, the Facebook page on his memory motivated thousands of Egyptians 
that transformed it to one of the mobilizing forces of the 25th of January Uprising. 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Interview with Ahmed Emad Hamdy April 30, 2015. 
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2.2. The 18 Days of Tahrir  
Tahrir was more than a demonstration; it was the creation of a dynamic and 
resourceful community of citizens brought together by the shared goal of bringing true 
democracy to Egypt.’ (Roccu, 2013). 
 
The 18 days that became to be known as the Egyptian Revolution or the ‘Tahrir 
Commune’ were the initial social movement that led to the collapse of the Mubarak 
rule. The 18 days were a very live process that every second meant a defining moment 
for protestors that maintained their daily demonstrators and the occupation of Tahrir 
square for day and night, camping there for the 18 days and not giving up on the 
unifying demand: on Mubarak’s resignation.  
 
Beinin points out that the January 25th uprising was a revolution. For him, it was similar 
to the previous examples in Egyptian historical memory like the ‘1919 Revolution’, the 
‘July 23 Revolution’ or coup d’état of Nasser. He calls these events ‘revolutions’ 
because of their popularity driven by the political mobilization within the country 
(Beinin, 2013). 
 
In the 18 days, dynamics changed daily, even by the hour so the president and the ruling 
coalition were forced to deliver quick responses. The clearing of the square from the 
police on the 30th of January and the transfer of security from the police to the army 
was one of the decisive moments. Every day was marked with changing dynamics and 
its own unique character. 25th of January was the day of rage, 28th Friday of Anger, 1st 
of February the million March, 4th Departure Friday, 6th Sunday of the Martyrs, 8th the 
Love of Egypt, 11 Departure Friday. 
 
2.2.1. 25th Day of Rage 
On January 14, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia left his seat after ruling with an iron 
fist for 23 years. On January 18, a young Egyptian Asmaa Mahfouz from April Six 
Movement uploaded a video to YouTube and called out to fellow Egyptians:  
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‘Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire so that maybe we can have a 
revolution like Tunisia; maybe we can have freedom justice honor and human 
dignity. I, am a girl, and I am going down to Tahrir Square, and I will stand 
alone. We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25th. If you still want to 
live in honor, we have to go down and demand our rights, our fundamental 
human rights. (‘Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video that Helped Spark the 
Egyptian Uprising’, 2011) 
 
 
She asked for fellow Egyptians to unite under the grand banner of honor to join the 
protests on the 25th. The meeting places were announced on the on social media pages 
of the April 6 and We Are All Khalid Said Movements. The police were prepared, and 
the goal was to disable the protesters from reaching Tahrir Square. When the day 
arrived, the crowd that met from one demonstration to another in Cairo thought that 
there was going to be the usual crew in the square, exposed to police violence as usual, 
yet, the protesters turned out to be mistaken as thousands and thousands marched from 
the Interior Ministry to Tahrir Square.11  
 
On the other hand, in Northern Egypt, former Nasserist deputy Hamdeen Sabahi was 
leading another protest. In other cities in Egypt, at Tanta, Kafr al-Dawwar, Ismailia, 
Suez, Mahalla el Kubra, Alexandria thousands gathered for protests with popular chants 
among the cities: ‘Corruption caused this country’s destruction!, We are saying million 
times Mubarak we want you out  and "Mubarak, your plane is waiting.’ (For a list of 
slogans day by day see: Appendix 2). 
 
While the police fired tear gas, shot with rubber bullets, and even used live ammunition 
in Cairo, the protesters passed the police forces and entered the square. They were 
tweeting and asking for their fellow Egyptians to come to the square12. As a response to 
the brutal police attack, the citizens living near the square opened their homes to their 
fellow citizens. However, the masses occupied the square and built a small commune 
with tents and central coordination organs resulting in the birth of common symbols. 
One of the first accomplishments was to set up a local radio station. Committee of Wise 
Men was created with the will of the protestors in the square to push for demands.  
                                                
11 Interview with Hesham Shafiq, March 20, 2015.	  
12 Main hash tags were ‘# tahrir # jan25, # amneldawla, # elbardie (Iskander, 2011) 
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When nightfall came at the end of the day of rage, Twitter and the internet servers were 
dashed. Five people lost their lives.13 The next day the Tahrir metro line was shut down. 
(Ghobashy, 2012) Deaths started to appear as the protestors and police confronted. 
Some protestors tried to burn down NDP office, but the crowd sought to maintain the 
square. Social media was crucial to escalate participation and share vital and updated 
information. People shared codes on how to pass the Internet restrictions (Iskander, 
2012). Mohamed ElBaradei from National Association for Change was saying that: ‘the 
people have broken the barrier of fear. There is no going back.’ The contention was 
everywhere, while Friday was chosen for the day of anger against the regime on January 
27, hundreds of relatives of the detainees’ demonstrated in front of police station 
chanting the slogans ‘Enough! We want our kids!’ (Ghobashy, 2012)  
 
2.2.2. 28th Friday of Anger 
Friday was leading to anger and unity. On a Facebook page with more than 70,000 
signatories, the demonstrators were writing to gather at more than 30 mosques and 
churches in Cairo and sending messages of unity like: ‘Egypt's Muslims and Christians 
will go out to fight against corruption, unemployment and oppression and absence of 
freedom’ (‘Egypt tense ahead of protests’, 2011). 
 
Contention continued and spread to other cities gathering more people due to Friday 
being the holiday. Muslim Brotherhood had announced that it was joining the protests 
for the first time since the 25th followed by other opposition parties. The internet was 
shot down in the country. While trying to contain the protests, the main opposition 
leader El-Baradei was taken into house arrest. So was Wael Ghonim, the ‘We are all 
Khalid Said’ Facebook page coordinator and the head of Google in the Middle East. 
(later to write the book called ‘Revolution 2.0’). The wave of arrests included chief 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood like Abdel-Moniem Abdel-Maksoud, Essam El-
Erian and Mohammed Morsi. 
 
On that day tanks were deployed in Cairo in the main squares. With the army on the 
scene, Mubarak announced that he had dismissed the government. While the police 
                                                
13 See: Appendix 3 for the Martyrs of the Revolution 
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faded away robbery and security problems spread over the city. To provide surveillance, 
popular comities were created, and they put checkpoints in certain neighborhoods to 
exercise security. The tourists and foreigners rushed to the airport (‘Egypt protests: 
Army rules out the use of force’, 2011). All around the country 664 people lost their 
lives in the day of anger. Egypt was on the brink. 
 
2.2.3. 1st of February the million March 
On 30th of January, the state judges and even General Tantawi, head of the armed 
forces, joined the protests. El-Baradei was released and came to the square requesting a 
new constitution and a transitional government. The existence of prominent figures 
created the impression that Mubarak was on the edge. Shafik was ordered to form the 
government.  
 
Another crucial event that happened became the symbols of the uprising was the 
solidarity between Muslims and Christians who formed a human shelter to protect 
Muslims during the prayer time to protect them from the interference (Christians 
protecting Muslims during their prayers in Tahrir Square, Egypt, 2011). On February 1st 
Mubarak appeared on national television trying to reconquer the unity that was 
sustained in the square and started his speech as follows: 
 
In light of this refusal to the call for dialogue and this is a call which remains 
standing, I direct my speech today directly to the people, its Muslims and 
Christians, old and young, peasants and workers, and all Egyptian men and 
women in the countryside and city over the whole country (‘Hosni Mubarak's 
speech: full text’, 2011). 
 
He promised the democratization of the regime and promotion of employment adding 
that he was ready for a ‘national dialogue’. More importantly he stated that he would 
not seek another term with a peaceful transition to September elections. One of the 
major concessions was that there would be a reform in the presidential system that 
would limit his rights. While the protestors were not satisfied, the next day turned out to 
be a catastrophe that will be remembered as the day of the Battle of Camel.  The attack 
of pro-Mubarak thugs, known as the baltagiya on horses and camels in the square left 
11 dead. Some of the thugs said that they were paid by the regime to attack the 
protestors (‘Egyptian opposition defiant over VP's warning’, 2011). 
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Though the Egyptian military declared that they would not interfere to the protests and 
were on the side of the protestors, the thugs entered the square with camels causing one 
of the deadliest moments to occur (‘Egypt protests: Army rules out the use of force’, 
2011). The military did not fire, but did not stop the gangs from killing protestors, 
either. 
 
2.2.4. 4th Departure Friday  
The violence with the Battle of Camel on the 4th of February did not stop thousands of 
people turning out to the square with children and whole families in a spirit resembling 
a family day out. This was followed by the support of the army with the defense 
minister Tantawi’s visit to Tahrir Square. Chants of ‘the army and people are united’ 
were shouted. Mass prayers took place in Tahrir while the internet services were being 
restored. Protesters erected a vast banner on a building in Tahrir Square listing their 
demands. (See: Table 3) 
 
Table 3: Demands of Departure Friday 
1. Mubarak should step down. 
2. The rigged parliament should be dissolved. 
3. A freely elected parliament should introduce the constitutional amendments 
necessary for presidential elections. 
4. The immediate prosecution and referral to trial of the “murderers” of pro-
democracy protesters, and of those implicated in corruption. 
Source: ‘Egypt revolution live updates: minute by minute account of Departure Friday’, 2011 
 
These demands became the consensus in the square. Crucial changes came with the 4th 
of February as four interior ministry civil servants were arrested. Shafik was negotiating 
with the protestors which provided them with recognition. Muslim Brotherhood’s 
formative tone contributed to the unity of the protests. While giving an interview to the 
press, Essam El-Erian from the organization was trying to ensure that they did not 
possess a hidden agenda as a response to the regime’s attempts to label protestors as 
Islamists. The scenes of Coptic Christians building a human shield for Muslims in 
prayers to protect them from the police attack became become a symbol of the nature of 
the uprising. The gains of the protestors were increasing while Mubarak was becoming 
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trapped. The bank accounts of Mohamed Rashid, former Minister of Industry, was 
frozen, and he was banned from going abroad (‘Minister of Trade Rashid Mohamed 
Rashid banned from leaving Egypt’, 2011). 
 
On the same day Shafik also stated that the government was holding talks with different 
organizations that participated in the movement and they were close to reaching an 
agreement. The Committee of Wise Men14, made up of critical names from the square 
like respected scholars, moderate Islamists and liberals, emerged as a medium to 
negotiate with the government (See: Table 4). Members included George Ishaq, a 
liberal opposition member, previously leader of Kefaya Movement, Abdel Monem al 
Fotuh, head of the doctors’ syndicate and a member of the Brotherhood (after the 
protests he was to split away from the Brotherhood and form the Strong Egypt Party), 
Fahmi Howeidy, an ex-columnist for Al Ahram and Islamist thinker15, Ahmad Zuweil, 
a prominent Egyptian chemists, Farouk el Baz, a space scientist, Amr Moussa secretary 
general and former foreign minister and a representative from head of the Arab Socialist 
Union’s Youth Bureau, and  Nabil Fahmy former Egyptian ambassador to the United 
States. 
 
Table 4: Demands of the Committee of Wise Man 
1. The protection of the life of protestors 
2. The government to put an end to the attacks by thugs and hooligans;. 
3. Stopping the arrest and detention of pro-democracy activists and the release of the arrested. 
4. The military should assist peaceful transition of power in Egypt 
 
Source: ‘Egypt revolution live updates: minute by minute account of Departure Friday’, 2011   
 
Despite the events that was storming the country, Mubarak was trying to hold on. On 
the 5th , Chief of the Coptic Church Pope Shenouda III, appeared on state television in 
support of Mubarak, (‘Pope Shenouda III supports Mubarak’, 2011) while the grand 
Mufti asked the protesters end their protests by declaring the uprising as ‘haram16’. 
                                                
14 Cook names them as potential interlocutors between the regime and the opposition. (Cook, 2012) 
15 See. İnce (2011) 
16 Haram is an Arabic term that means forbidden.  
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With their untimely support for the regime, both religious leaders failed to attract the 
public and lost their reputation in the eye of the public. 
 
2.2.5. 11th of February Departure Friday 
More issues became public when the halt on internet was lifted causing the 
documentation of the events through the internet reaching thousands of people. Towards 
the inevitable end, the slogan ‘the army and the people one hand’ became as famous as 
‘the people want to topple the regime’ or ‘erhal’ meaning leave. However, during the 
18 days the army committed atrocities against the protestors and repeatedly asked them 
to go home (‘Egypt protests, Wednesday 9 February’, 2011). It took Mubarak some 
days to leave.  
 
The two-day massive strikes around the country (see Appendix 4: Strikes of 8 and 9 
February) pushed Mubarak to leave power as the strikes in crucial workplaces like 
transport halted the country. On the other hand, the week that was relatively free from 
police repression was like a festival centered in the middle of Cairo. Songs were sung, 
discussions were led, the squares were filled by people, both children and elderly, 
posing in front of burnt cars telling stories.  
 
On the 9th when Mubarak insisted on staying in power, the protestors camped in front of 
different institutions like the Shura Council, the Parliament, the Presidential Palace 
pushing for their demands to be implemented. Then NDP was starting to dissolve. 
There was the tremendous turnout that resulted in the highest legitimacy. While 
Suleiman was talking about commissions to investigate crimes and prisoner amnesty, 
the protestors were convinced; Mubarak had to go. 
 
The first clear moment that the army was taking over the rule was the meeting of SCAF 
on the 10th without the president (as the supreme commander which is the president 
leads the meeting), which Kandil names as the soft coup (Kandil, 2012:490). On the 
11th Suleiman declared that Mubarak was gone and the generals taken over the power. 
Two days later SCAF dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution. 
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2.3. The Second Wave  
The second wave started with SCAF officially ruling the country. As the Crisis Group’s 
report on the reign of the military pointed out brilliantly; the military rule was ‘arrogant, 
reluctant to share power and was seeing itself as the only actor that possessed the 
experience, maturity and wisdom necessary to protect the country from domestic and 
external threats’. (Crisis Group, 2012) However, there were many contentious actions 
boiling up in the country and the military rule was left with the burden to take care of it, 
forcing the military to seek a civilian partner that it could trust.  
 
2.3.1. The handful stays in the square  
One of the first things that SCAF wanted to do was to clear the squares. It tried to ease 
it during the infamous 18 days, yet, now under their rule it was becoming unacceptable. 
Many left. The ones that stayed urged on a civilian-led government and the abolishing 
the repressive state of emergency. The ones who remained and insisted on staying in the 
square were keen on their rights as citizens to seek for accountability and were 
demanding a true democratization process in Egypt. Their language was kind and 
explanatory and the only method they used was staying in the squares. In a 
proclamation they were saying ‘please publish this and photocopy to increase its 
usefulness’ (Tahrir Documents, 2011a) about their statement banner that they were 
distributing in the square. However, as they were smaller in numbers they were forced 
to leave. (for the Demands of the Group from a sit in see: Appendix 5) 
 
On the 3rd of March Ahmad Shafik who had been appointed by the Mubarak regime 
resigned. Figures like Ayman Nour head of El-Ghad (the liberal party) was declaring 
that the transition to be on the right track while on the other hand El Baradei (National 
Association for Change) was saying that ‘today the old regime has finally fallen.’ 
(‘Egypt's prime minister resigns’, 2011). 
 
While the contention remained in the square on March 9, the military interfered brutally 
and evacuated Tahir Square arresting 180 people. The notorious virginity tests were 
conducted in this period (‘Egypt's army passes draft constitutional amendments’, 2011).  
Some other public sector workers and bank employees were also protesting in 
Alexandria and other cities (Mc Greal, 2011). What was in quest from the military’s 
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perspective was the immediate return to a stable order with people going to their work 
and no strikes or protests popping out from here to there.   
 
2.3.2. First Constitutional Amendments  
Just weeks later, the military pushed the constitutional amendments to the 1971 
constitution and proposed that the transition to a civilian rule would be over after the 
elections in 6 months. The amendments were written by a committee of eight that the 
military attained.  
 
As Brotherhood was promoting the yes vote to reach parliamentary elections as soon as 
possible, the opposition was accusing the party for making a deal with the military 
(‘Egypt approves constitutional changes,’ 2011). The rumors of the deal were 
strengthened while political prisoners like Aboud al-Zomor , who was arrested in 1984 
for planning to assassinate Sadat, were released. While, 6th of April Movement, 
Nasserist and liberal groups were proposing that it was too soon for the elections, the 
March referendum passed with a participation of %44 with %77 yes vote. (Tarek, 2011 
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Table 5: Constitutional Amendments  of March 2011 
On 
Presidency 
Four-year term in office, with a maximum of two terms for any one 
individual. 
On 
Presidency 
In order to be president ones parents cannot be dual citizens of another 
state; and second, the president may not be married to a non-Egyptian. 
On 
Presidency 
Independents would have to fulfill one of two requirements: either 
receiving endorsements from 30 members of parliament, or signatures from 
30,000 eligible voters living in 15 governorates. 
Electoral 
Process 
Full judicial oversight for the entire electoral process, from voter 
registration to the announcement of results. 
Eligibility for 
Office 
The supreme constitutional court, rather than the parliament, would decide 
who is eligible to take office. 
Vice 
presidency  
The president would be required to appoint a Vice President within 60 days 
of taking office. If the Vice President's job becomes vacant, the president 
must "immediately" appoint a replacement. 
Constitutional 
Change 
Constitutional amendments may be proposed either by the president or the 
lower house of parliament, and will then be referred for a parliamentary 
vote and a public referendum17. 
State of 
Emergency 
The president can still declare a state of emergency, but the constitutional 
committee proposed two changes. A parliamentary majority would have to 
approve the declaration within seven days; and, if the president seeks to 
extend it beyond six months, it would be subject to a public referendum. 
Terrorism 
Law 
Terrorism law that proposed that "the president may refer any terror crime 
to any judiciary body," which allowed Mubarak to bypass civilian courts 
and try "terrorism suspects" in front of military or emergency courts to be 
abolished. 
 
 
Source: Carlstorm, 2011 
 
 
                                                
17 To note that changes requested by the president must have cabinet approval; changes requested by the parliament 
must be endorsed by at least half of the members in both houses. The revised article 189 would also require the new 
parliament to appoint a constitutional assembly within six months of taking office. That assembly would draft a new 
constitution, which would then be submitted to a public referendum. (Carlstorm 2011) 
	  
 
 
47	  
 
2.3.3. The Infamous Feloul  
Although the protests ended, it was clear that the streets gained a legitimate status to 
express demands. The first action was the storming of the state security headquarters 
where the feloul had destroyed documents. (‘Egypt: Protesters raid on Cairo state 
security HQ’, 2011) On the other hand, around 2,000 police officers held protests for 
better wages and tried to clear the bad reputation they had. Some other public sector 
workers and bank employees were also protesting in Alexandria and other cities.  
 
As demonstrators were insisting on their demands (for the demands of the April 6 
Movements in April see: Appendix 6) the change was seen on the horizon. In April 1 it 
was decided Mubarak's name was going to be removed from public places while his 
sons were to be jailed for corruption and the abuse of authority. One of the demands of 
the uprising, a new minimum wage and 15% rise in salaries and pensions, was met in 
April, proving success of the mass protests. 
 
The feloul was starting to be punished as Rachid Mohamed Rachid, the country's former 
trade and industry minister, was given 15 years, and Amr Assal, a former industrial 
chief, received 10 years. Ahmed Ezz was sentenced to prison with a debt of 10 million 
to its fellow citizens (Kirkpatrick & Afify, 2011). However, the military was holding 
the grip in its hand, proved by the fact that eight military officers who joined Mubarak 
trials demonstrations were interrogated in military courts. 
 
2.3.4. A Second Revolution? 
Although the army promised a transition process, it was in fact carrying out similar 
policies against the opposing groups in the country.  The July Riots, named as the 
second uprising against the military, mainly took place in Cairo, Suez and Alexandria 
with demonstrations that resembled the first wave but this time with a lower number of 
participants. The protests were conducted due to growing discontent with the lack of 
change despite the period of 6 months after the revolution. The masses who met in the 
square were heavily interfered by the military. Concentrated on parliamentary work and 
avoiding confrontation with the military, Muslim Brotherhood was criticized by the 
opposition groups for its non-existence and silence (Amrani, 2011). 
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Furthermore, the newly formed labor unions after the uprising ETIUF (the official 
ETUF boycotted it) joined the protests, too. The main demand was the persistence of a 
civilian government but economic demands were on the agenda as well. On July 1st and 
8th the reoccupation of main squares in Alexandria and Suez as well as Tahrir in Cairo 
took place under the leadership of the April 6 Movement with the slogan: ‘the families 
of the martyrs and the poor first18’ (Beinin, 2011). However by staying in the squares, 
the July 17 gains were firing of Egypt's antiquities, finance, industry ministers. The 
military which was trying to disable the passage to civilian politics was now saying that: 
the prime minister Sharaf was not entitled to appoint or dismiss ministers under the 
interim constitution. (Shackner, 2011) 
 
In the heated atmosphere of August 2011, the Al-Ahram newspaper writer Wael 
Eskandar (August, 2011) made a list of unfulfilled promises which summed up the 
process. Among the unkept promises, the followings were eye-cathcing: the leaving 
power in six months, holding parliamentary elections in September, protecting the 
protestors, investigating torture19, stopping the mismanagement of military tribunals, 
preparing for the presidential elections would take place in 2011 and providing freedom 
of media.  
 
Setting off from June, the protests grew in November as military was delaying the 
promises and judging civilians in military courts. On November 11, the National 
Association for Change issued a statement titled ‘an Army That Protects Us, Not 
Governs Us’ in order to push the army to hand the power to a temporary government 
that would possess presidential powers and focus on solely security issues until a new 
government is elected. Only then this new government would be responsible for 
cleaning the feloul elements off the Interior Ministry. The expectation from this interim 
government was to abolish rules like the ban on strikes and protest and work on the 
small scale solutions for the economy and unemployment. (Gaweesh, 2011)  
                                                
18 For the main demands of the April 6 Movement in the Second Wave see: Appendix 6.  
19 According to Aida Seif El-Dawla, the director of El Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and 
Torture, methods include beating the feet, whipping, suspension in painful positions, solitarily confinement, sexual 
abuse, death threats and attacks on relatives. 
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2.3.5. Time to Leave 
However, the military was not going to lead the changes that the opposition requested. 
The October events remained as a smutch of the military in the interim period. It 
became more apparent when the Copts raided the headquarters of state television to 
protest the sectarian sentiments of a programme. The confrontation with the military 
killed 28 and injured many. In the incident which was called the Masrepo Events 
Egyptian soldiers drove over protesters with armored vehicles and fired live 
ammunition into a crowd of unarmed Coptic group. From the autopsy reports it was 
clear that the crowd was crushed to death by vehicles.  
 
After Masrepo, Essam Sharaf, the interim prime minister, offered his resignation to the 
ruling council, but it was not accepted. Hazem el-Beblawi, then the finance minister, 
made a statement on a private television channel saying that ‘the government failed in 
its main responsibility, which is to provide security, and it should at least acknowledge 
its failure to give this issue the effort it needed and apologize.’ (Kirkpatrick & Afify, 
2011) The anger was intensifying against the army. 
 
Between 14th to 19th November, the demonstrators filled the square again denouncing 
the army. 45 were killed protesting against military rule in street battles around 
Mohemad Mahmoud Street. The violence escalated on 16th December in 2011 when the 
demonstrations outside the cabinet office led to 17 deaths. This was followed with more 
arrests leaving 12,000 civilians on trials in military courts (Bush, 2012). 
 
In November the numbers grew in the square and the Brotherhood aiming for the 
elections to take place was putting pressure on the military. The opposition reunited in 
the square and signed a document called ‘finishing the revolution’ declaring the army as 
the hindrance to progress. The 18 groups that signed the document included the 
revolutionary committees that were formed in the Tahrir Square and various Egyptian 
cities (see: Appendix 7: Let us Return to the Squares to Complete our Revolution). In 
the square there were puppets of Tantawi with the slogans ‘we are not leaving, but he 
is’ (meaning Tantawi) and ‘the people want to bring down the field marshal.’ (for 
slogans see: Appendix 2). SCAF was losing credibility as one protestor in the square 
was underlining:  
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We have one enemy, the military regime and its political dictatorship … It is 
imperative that we bring down the … military regime, and that there be a 
complete separation between the military and political activity. (‘Maikel Nabil 
slams Egyptian military regime as the enemy’, 2012) 
 
The Bloody Football Massacre in February that caused the death of 74 people was the 
breaking point against the military rule. At the stadium of Port Said, during a league 
football match between the rival teams El Masry and El Ahly20 fans (primarily started 
with El Masry attack) fought each other while the doors of the stadium were locked and 
the security forces disappeared in an odd way. Testimonies pointed out to a planned 
massacre due to the lack of police search and presence and used the words ‘revenge’ for 
Ahly’s support and the previous conflict with the security forces. In the next four days, 
the streets leading to the Ministry of Interior in Cairo were blocked off by El Ahly fans 
who harshly confronted security forces and demanded the removal of people they 
accused of being Mubarak loyalists within the ministry, but little was done to heed their 
calls (Piazzese, 2015). 
 
After the massacre, an opposition was uniting again under the banner Kazeboon 
meaning ‘they are lying.’ Around 37 groups issued a statement against the army saying 
that it was reproducing the old regime and dragging the country into chaos and turning 
the revolution into a military coup. In never ending street movement the elections came.  
 
2.3.6. Parliamentary Elections 
The first free parliamentary elections of modern Egypt took place after a long delay 
following the first proposal to hold. A year after the uprisings the parties took place in 
the elections through forming blocks. The biggest of all was the Democratic Alliance 
for Egypt in which the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 
emerged. The alliance was formed in July with the number of parties joining the 
alliance reaching 34. However, many parties left the alliance because of FJP's 
domination on candidates. (Anani, 2011)  
 
                                                
20 Kandil (2012) defines the sports fans group of El Ahly of the Ultras as the semi-anarchist fans that has protected 
demonstrators against police brutality in the Egyptian Uprising.  
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   Source: The list is gathered from Al Ahram English’s series on the presidential elections.  
 
The Islamist Alliance was made up of the Salafi al-Nour Party, the Salafi al-Asala Party 
and the Building and Development Party, traditional actors coming from Mubarak era.  
Dominated by inter-party conflicts, the Egyptian Bloc (The Egyptian Bloc, 2011) 
formed in August was the main central-left alliance consisting of the Free Egyptians 
Party21, the Social Democratic Party and al-Tagammu. Established to confront the 
Democratic Alliance the block stated that ‘Islamists are welcome to join the party if 
they share the values specified by the bloc’ (‘Liberal, leftist and Sufi forces create 
electoral bloc in Egypt’, 2011) but was divided over the naming of candidates.  
                                                
21 The Free Egyptians Party was founded in April with 100,000 registered members. 
Table 6: Alliances at November 2011 Elections 
Name Parties 
Revolution Continues Alliance The Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the Egyptian 
Socialist Party, the Egyptian Current Party, the 
Egypt Freedom Party, Equality and Development 
Party, the Revolution’s Youth Coalition, the 
Egyptian Alliance Party. 
 
Islamist Bloc (Alliance for 
Egypt) 
Al-Nour Party, Al-Asala Party, Building and 
Development Party. 
Egyptian Block Free Egyptians Party, the Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party and Al-Tagammu Party. 
 
Democratic Alliance for Egypt Freedom and Justice Party, Al-Karama Party, Ghad 
Al-Thawra Party, Labor Party, Al-Islah wal-Nahda 
Party, Al-Hadara Party, Al-Islah Party, Al-Geel 
Party, Misr Al-Arabi Al-Ishtiraki Party, Al-Ahrar 
Party, Al-Horiyya wal-Tanmiya Party. 
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Figure 1: Ratio of Deputies in 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Blocs 
 
With an overall %54 participation, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) took 235 seats and 
emerged as the winner of the elections. Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of seats in 
parliament while the Salafi Noor party got 25%. The Revolution Continues Alliance, 
the emerging secular electoral alliance in Egypt dominated by youth groups at the 
forefront of the protests that toppled Mubarak, attracted less than a million votes and 
took just seven seats22 (Coleman, 2012). 
 
2.3.7. Presidential Elections 
Right after parliamentary elections, the process of presidential elections started and the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) entered the political scene. As the elections were 
not conducted under the law of political isolation, the court claimed the process 
unconstitutional. It argued that the rules governing candidate selection had been 
misapplied, giving the candidates of political parties an unfair advantage over those 
standing as independents (Alexander, 2014:206). So just as Morsi was elected at June 
2012 the Supreme Constitutional Court had dissolved the newly elected lower chamber 
of the parliament.  
                                                
22 On a statement the group was saying ‘We are your sons and your daughters and your brothers and your relatives 
and neighbors we went out on January 25, to liberate Egypt from the darkness confirms his refusal to cooperate with 
any political forces or support candidates affiliated with the former regime, and is aimed primarily to defend the 
revolution.’ 
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The presidential elections took place at two rounds first 23/24 May and the second 16 
/17 June. In June 24 the victory was Mohammed Morsi’s. In the elections, among the 
nominees an ex-Brotherhood member Fotouh was representing ‘a milder Islamism’ with 
a socialist face while Amr Moussa, the old general secretary for the Arab League, 
portrayed a more liberal tone. The leading figures were Mohamed Morsi of the 
Brotherhood, Ahmed Shafik, a senior commander, minister of Civil Aviation for 10 
years under Mubarak and a short term prime minister from 29 January to March 3, 
2011, who represented the old regime and Hamdeen Sabbahi the social 
democrat/Nasserist leader. As Şahin notes (2014) the ones in quest for an alternative 
rather than the Brotherhood and ‘feloul’ supported Hamdeen Sabbahi.  
While Sabbahi boycott the run-offs Morsi and Shafik were on the second run. Another 
president nominee from the Socialist Popular Alliance Party Abu-al Ezz al-Hariri had 
described the Islamists as a greater danger than Shafik. However, in June 2012 a 
coalition of opposition parties and figures agreed to support Morsi in a meeting named 
as the Fairmont Hotel Meeting. Figures like Wael Ghoneim, Ahmed Maher, head of 
April 6 Youth Movement, writer Alaa Al-Aswany and revolutionary formations like 
The National Front for the Protection of the Revolution joined the meeting’ (Shukrallah, 
2012). 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Source: Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi wins Egypt's presidential race, 2012. 
 
At the end of the meeting Maher, the leader of April 6 Movement stated that: ‘the 
failure of the revolutionary movement to decide on one candidate left them the choice 
Table 7: Results of Presidential Elections of 2012  
Candidates  Results in the 
First Round (%) 
Results in the 
Second Round (%) 
Mohamed Morsi %25  %51.7 
Ahmed Shafik %24 %48.3 
Hamdeen Sabahi %21 - 
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh %17 - 
Amr Moussa %11 - 
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of either backing the Brotherhood candidate or the perceived candidate of the military. 
We made the choice given the circumstances.’ (Shukrallah, 2012)  
2.4. The Morsi Era- the Third Wave 
When it was announced that the victory was Morsi’s he declared that ‘he would rule for 
all Egyptians’.23Not being able to have a parliament, his term started with the primary 
confrontation of one of the state institutions; the constitutional court.  Strikes set off 
from the beginning of the era. Two weeks after he was sworn in, the biggest firm in 
textile industry known notorious for the government with contentious strikes in mid 
2000s launch a strike that covered about 20.000 workers asking for rises and 
government help. When being rocked by a terror attack in August in the Israeli border, 
Egypt responded with aerial strikes on militants. The term was going to be hard. 
 
On July 8, as a first move Morsi issued a decree calling back into session the dissolved 
parliament and the new parliamentary elections to take place within 60 days after the 
make-up of the constitution. SCC rejected Morsi’s wish to open the parliament and 
proposed that the president did not possess the power to re-open it. Ignoring the appeal 
on 10th of July, the parliament convened. The SCC responded with anger while the 
parliament asked Egypt's Court of Cassation to overrule the decision, which again failed 
(Shahine, 2012). On the 11th July in the deadlock Morsi gave up on opening the 
parliament as a primary step and tried to seek for partners to continue governance. 
Morsi made a move for the ‘revolutionaries’ by releasing 572 people detained by the 
Egyptian military in the 2011 protests, and reduced the sentence of 16 others from life 
sentence to seven years in jail. (Egypt's President Mursi pardons 'revolutionaries', 2012) 
The next step was swapping Tantawi with Sisi.  
 
2.4.1. Structural Changes? 
On 22 September when Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court upheld an earlier 
Supreme Constitutional Court ruling, which had ordered the dissolution of the lower 
house of Egypt's parliament, Morsi saw no other way than extreme powers to reverse 
the institutions that led to the constitutional declaration. He appointed a pro 
Brotherhood judge Mahmoud Mekki, as his vice President (Ezzat, 2012). Under the 
                                                
23 For the whole speech See: Appendix 8.	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name ‘completing the revolution’ Morsi also announced the constitutional amendments 
that was passed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) giving him, his 
office the power to conduct legislative and executive changes to finish the constitution.  
 
After the appeal contention was on the streets.  While he focused on constitutional 
amendments, activist groups and political parties were protesting in October, after a 
court acquitted all 24 people charged with involvement in the Battle of Camel. But 
though the protests were a once uniting element, the new ones were scattered in a pro 
and against Morsi camp, solidifying an opposition that was becoming more agitated. 
The pro-Morsi camp was thinking discontent was delaying the path to constitutional 
clashes. On 12 October two competing rallies occurred in Tahrir one pro and one 
against Morsi.  As the constitutional referendum approached the process worsened. 
(‘Egyptian 'Battle of the Camels' officials acquitted’, 2012) 
 
2.4.2. November Clashes Over the Constitution  
November was marked with the contest for constitutional changes. While Article Six in 
the 2011 amendment was saying that no judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council or 
the Constituent Assembly, the new constitution gave the presidency the controversial 
power saying that it can take the ‘necessary actions and measures to protect the country 
and the goals of the revolution.’ (Amnesty, 2012a) Morsi was insisting on changing the 
constitution. He taught that the institutional problems would be solved if the 
constitution passed with the support of people power through referendum. The 
referendum passed but peace did not come. Arrests, contention and repression 
continued. (For events and arrests in third wave see: table 8) 
 
As popular demonstrations turning more and more violent creating more insecurity, the 
military was granted the power to arrest until the constitutional process ended. 
However, when the quarrel occurred between the protestors and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, according to the Şahin (2015) SCAF remained silent as the emerging 
constitution benefited the military, giving a veto over any national security or sensitive 
foreign policy issue. (Şahin, 2015) Blood spilled. At the total wave, 470 lost their lives.  
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    Source: Wikithawra. Accessed at March 9, 2015. 
 
New power to arrest was not the only privilege given to the military in the new 
constitutional declaration. In the Morsi Era the alleged custom that a military officer 
had to be a minister of defense was untouched. The establishment of a 15-member 
National Defense Council with Article 182 that stated: ‘the SCAF shall undertake the 
examination of the matter pertaining to the methods of ensuring the safety and security 
of the country’ and the articles 193 and 197 stating the council was responsible of 
safeguarding the military budget and military law were the gains of military. This article 
was one of the major objections of activists of ‘no to military trials’ to act against the 
Morsi governance (Kingsley, 2013). 
 
Table 8:  Events and Arrests in the Third Wave 
Event Date Arrests 
1. The First Syria Embassy 
Events 
July 18, 2012  25 
2..The Second Syria 
Embassy Events 
September 4, 2012 14 
3. American Embassy 
Events 
12 to 15 September, 2012 459 
4. Anti-Morsi Protests November 19 to 30, 2012 541 
5. The Constitutional 
Declaration Protests 
December 5, 2012 166 
6.The events of the 
anniversary of the 
revolution 
January 24 to February 15, 2013 479 
7.Contention in the Street February 26 and March 3 and 
March 27, 2013 
179 
8.Corniche Events 3 to 12 March 2013 303 
9.Moqattam clashes 23 March, 2013 71  
10.Clashes in Cairo March-July, 2012 414 
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2.4.3. Failure to Form a National Dialogue  
The discontent untied the ‘discontenters’. Egypt's main opposition met under National 
Salvation Front, an alliance of political parties against Morsi to turn over the process of 
constitutional declaration. Once united, the uneasy deal, the promise of Morsi to fulfil 
the demands of the revolution had failed. If there was an ever Tahrir Coalition, it was 
the end.  
Constitution Party, Egyptian Popular Current Nasserist Party, Free Egypt Party, 
National Association for Change, Egyptian Communist Party, Free Egyptians Party, 
New Wafd Party, Egyptian Social Democratic Party and some others joined the 
coalition with the Mubarak-era minister Amr Moussa. While Morsi was determined not 
to give in, the violent clashes occurred between the protestors and the military did not 
do much to contain the confrontations. The Mubarak figures were replaced with Morsi 
graffiti’s. (Hussein & Black, 2012) 
Right after the constitutional change, the confrontations continued between pro-Morsi 
and the revolutionaries. On the 21st of April Egypt's justice minister Ahmed Mekkyhas 
resigned. In Tanta, Egypt's Brotherhood governor was attacked with a shoe while 
Muslim Brotherhood quarters were set on fire.  
 
2.4.4. Tamrood and the Downfall  
The anger led to the formation of the Tamrood movement (Rebel) on April 2013. As a 
grass roots movement which aimed to assemble 15 million signatures, the campaign 
started as an initiative from below. However, as Şahin mentions the cross-class alliances 
and endorsement of the old regime figures of the movement, the protests turned into a 
coalition of liberal, right-wing and pro-Mubarak groups (Şahin, 2015) later to be taken 
over the military. The popularity of the contention turned the military against the 
Brotherhood and enabled them to posses power completely again. 
 
In Tamrood again the chances for Morsi to establish another national dialouge had been 
missed. Since November it had alienated every opposition party against its rule. The 
Brotherhood could not find an ally to fight against the coup that was about to come. It 
fell. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS 
3.1. Introduction to Analysis 
The analysis is formed in three sections. The first is to answer the question ‘who 
participated in the uprisings’ will be taken into consideration looking into traditional 
actors and new actors. The traditional actors will be the organized in groups that date 
back in modern Egyptian history, and the emerging ones will be taken into 
consideration as the ones that have led a pivotal role since 2005. As Cavatorta and Pace 
(2012) points out these new actors, including tribes, clans, and youth movements, have 
clearly been crucial in the uprisings, but traditional ones, such as the army and trade 
unions have also played and still play a major role. (Cavatorta & Pace, 2012) 
The study fragmented the Egyptian social movement into three waves, which interacted 
in a way that led to authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt. While there were certain 
characteristics of the certain wave that was sustained through authoritarian learning at 
overall, there were the general structural constraints that led to the resistance of 
authoritarianism in Egypt. By this fact, the second section will reveal the tactics that 
were used in the three cycles for authoritarian survival. 
 
Lastly, a final analysis will be given for the casual relationship between protest activity 
with on each cycle and for the process that encompasses the three cycles.  
3.2. Who Participated? The Actors of the Uprising  
What made the Egyptian Uprising a revolution was the massiveness that the protests 
portrayed. As the ones that participated explored hereinafter are a vast populace that is 
formed of organized political/social groups and ordinary citizens.  
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These protestors in each case, established a powerful unity in high numbers and strong 
commitment marching together wearing banners singing songs of solidarity and 
shouting slogans. (Tilly, 1999:256) Grouping is hard because as Tilly also points out ‘at 
various times, same people represent themselves as workers, residents, ethnics, women, 
citizens, gays, partisans and members of other categories that distinguish them from 
other parts of the population. In each case, they establish worthiness unity numbers and 
commitment marching together wearing banners singing songs of solidarity and 
shouting slogans. (Tilly, 1999:256) 
 
According to a witness Ramy Fakhr in the Egyptian experience: ‘there were people 
from all walks of life: older men with their families, middle aged men and women, 
groups of women, muslims, Christians, rich, poor and the majority were youth’ while 
another witness Amr Alim was saying that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood is highly 
represented, but so are all political parties’ (Noshokaty, 2011). Brown (2012) added that 
also state employees were dominantly joining the protests. 
 
Hellyer, (2011) on the other hand, points out that with everyone from trade unionists to 
ultraconservative Salafists participating in, the protest did not have a single path but the 
Revolutionary Youth and the Wise Man became the actors that led the conversation 
with the regime.  As it can be seen from their statements, the traditional parties were not 
sure to join the protests as Tagammu Party issued a statement the day before the 
protests stated that it would not participate Police Day, an inappropriate date for a mass 
demonstration. Similarly, Wafd party was hesitant to join, like Muslim Brotherhood. In 
an in-depth interview Shafiq 24 stated that though the Muslim Brotherhood was not 
joining the protests it’s youth was very active from day one and seeking for alternative 
organizations like April 6 or the Revolutionary Youth to join the protests.  The new 
actors lit the courage in the Egyptian Uprising. 
 
To name the determined groups that participated as organized groups apart from the 
general public were:  the 6 April Movement, syndicates, the Campaign in Support of 
Baradei, the Muslim Brotherhood Youth, the Youth Movement of the Democratic Front 
                                                
24	  Interview with Hesham Shafiq, March 20, 2015.	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Party, the centrist Islamist group called the (Center) Party, Nasserists, Kefaya, the April 
6 Youth Movement, the Popular Democratic Movement for Change, Mayehkomsh, 
bloggers, journalists, non-governmental organizations, Coalition of the Youth of the 
Revolution, Justice and Freedom group, National Association for Change Youth, 
Democratic Front Youth, independent trade unions, Mohammed ElBaradei’s National 
Association for Change, the established opposition parties, the Constitutional 
Committee (Kandil, 2010). 
 
Mahalla workers, Sinai Bedouins, civil servants employed by the cabinet, fans of the 
two biggest national soccer teams and Khalid Said’s mother joined the second week 
(Hill, 2013). The movement also included the ‘liberals’ outside Mubarak’s close circle 
and the Middle class who were deprived of their property rights and entrepreneurship 
due to inadequate legal system and difficulty to start their own business as it required 
dealing with fifty-six government agencies as explored in the work of de Soto. (Bowen, 
49:2012) 
 
In the Egyptian Uprising of 2011 the success came from the actors that were consisted 
of organized groups but massively the people, not a single opposition group against the 
regime. Named under new social movements, these movements delegitimized violence. 
(Durac, 2013) The diverse groups could co-exist and unite with the legitimacy that the 
non-violent protest sustained. This was evident from a participant Hassan Haddad’s 
quotes that the success of ‘the protests came from abolishing of all sorts of sectarian 
violence and harassment’ (Noshokaty & Fakr, 2011). In a non-sectarian and non-violent 
entity, the participants could connote and form identities through and affiliations with 
the movement.  
 
3.2.1. Traditional Actors 
Political opposition has been existing right after Sadat’s death and is formed through 
political parties and rights based movements.  
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Albrecht notes:  
 
the logic behind the toleration of opposition in Egypt is that opposition does not only 
figure as an opponent of the regime but – maybe at times even to a higher degree – as a 
potential political ally... The more heterogeneous the landscape of political opposition, 
the more opportunities for the regime to use one opposition camp, at least as a part-time 
ally, to check another. (Albrecht, 2005:390)  
 
3.2.1.1. The Egyptian Military  
The Egyptian military is the world's 10th largest army with near to 468,000 soldiers. 
(Sayigh, 2011) The institution acquires its political power from the coup of 1952 led by 
the Free Officers. By overthrowing the corrupt Western-controlled monarchy, Nasser’s 
rule of Egypt from 1956 to 1970 was marked by the entrenchment of the military’s 
economic and political position of privilege in Egyptian society.  
 
The Egyptian military is driven from every part of the society and is ethnically quite 
heterogeneous compared to the Syrian army (Heydemann, 2011 & Kandil, 2012) 
coming from every sector. It is an honorable job to be a part of the military and it is 
quite wide in Egyptian society. In an in depth interview Makade says that ‘everyone has 
a military relative in their family, proving the role of military in society25’. 
 
After Nasser’s death, Egypt was a defeated nation, crushed by the disastrous result of 
the 1967 war and poor economic planning. The peace treaty with Israel helped the 
military consolidate power. Since then it has achieved most of its privileges through the 
annually aid that US provides.  For the power of the military Cambanis (2010) says that:  
 
The military has built a highway from Cairo to the Red Sea; manufactures stoves and 
refrigerators for export; it even produces olive oil and bottled spring water. When riots 
broke out during bread shortages in March 2008, the army stepped in and distributed 
bread from its own bakeries, burnishing its reputation as Egypt’s least corrupt and most 
efficient state institution. (Cambanis, 2010 September 11) 
 
As the founding elite, the military plays an outstanding role in the organization of the 
center of power in Egypt. From the start of the uprising again driving from this 
legitimacy it portrayed itself as the guarantor of the regime. This was accepted by the 
                                                
25 Interview with Mahmoud Makade. 9 March, 2015. 
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public, as it was visible in the chants of the first wave ‘army and people hand to hand’ 
and the Committee of Wise Man’s quest to lead the negotiations with military rather 
than Mubarak or his government.  
 
Bellin (2012) sees the army as a separate apparatus and points out that it takes its 
position through the persistent negotiations that it conducts with the higher authoritarian 
structure. The point where Heydemann (2012) and Bellin meet is that the sectarian or 
the minority connection lowers the autonomy of the army. Consequently, this places the 
army into an organic part of the authoritarian structure. In the case of the Egyptian 
officers, it turns into a privilege as they are quite heterogeneous compared to the Syrian 
army, for recruitment patterns were informed primarily by meritocratic factors in which 
recruits were targeted from across the entire country.  
 
On the other hand, the Egyptian army posed an economic empire which sees as a means 
to generate a patronage network to buy the loyalty of the officer corps. During the 
transition period, one of the red lines that the army made clear was that their economic 
empire is not under discussion in any political system and the constitutional changes 
protected the confidentiality of the financial accounts of the army establishment.  As 
Sullivan proposes it possess an ownership that is worth 20-30 billion dollars. (Sullivan, 
2011) However exact numbers are not known as it has always ignored calls in 
parliament for budget transparency. While Demmelhuber (2011) added that military 
was involved in the real estate sector, the production of household appliances or 
subsidized bread, according to his estimates, military's business activities made up 20 
per cent of the country's annual economic output (Demmelhuber, 2011). 
 
3.2.1.2. Copts 
Driving from the Greek word ‘Aigytos’ meaning Egyptians, Copts are one of the oldest 
groups in Egypt making up the 10% of the population as the biggest minority 
(Buchanan, 2015) though numbers are not official. As Pennington informed:  
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… before the reign of Viceroy Muhammad Ali26 Egyptian Copts were subjected 
under Islamic citizenship law, which treated them as “Peoples of the Book” that 
entitled them to state protection but prohibited them from participating in 
politics, civil service, and the military. They were also obliged to pay special tax 
imposed on religious minorities (jizya) and were subjected to periodic 
discrimination and persecution from state authorities. (Pennington 1982: 158). 
 
The status of the Copts improved under Muhammad Ali’s regime, which incorporated 
Copts and other European Christians to his agency. (Vatikiotis 1991: 63-64) Their 
status as a protected minority was further strengthened by the Hatti Humayun Decree of 
1856, which declared that the Egyptian state would move to ‘legislate equality among 
people, revoking any sort of discrimination based upon ethnicity, race, or religion.’ 
(Makari 2007: 49)  
 
The decree guaranteed freedom of religion for Copts, abolished the jizya tax that they 
were required to pay as a religious minority, and cancelled many of the restrictions 
against non-Muslims under the Islamic rules, such as prohibitions from government 
service and the military. (Scott 2010: 37) As Pennington notes by the end of the 19th 
century, approximately 45 percent of all Egyptian civil servants were Copts. 
(Pennington 1982: 160) They were widely represented both within the civil service and 
the parliament, as wealthy Coptic families used their financial and political connections 
to ensure that Copts were represented in Egypt’s National Assembly. (Pennington 1982: 
164) 
 
Albrecht proposes that (2005) while ‘the millet partnership’ helped to protect the Copts, 
their priviliges were weakened significantly after the 1952 coup during the Nasser’s 
reign, as they were no longer having representation both within the National Assembly 
and civil service, making them more dependent on the regime instead of being self-
reliant.  
 
The church in the Nasser era was set with a political role in the 50s and 60s. As Soliman 
(2013) emphasizes while Islamization eroded secular spaces, the increasing number of 
Copts would only feel secure and welcome in their own religious space. 
                                                
26 The Ottoman Wali (ruled between 1805-1848) that later declared himself the ruler of Egypt and Sudan, carrying 
military and economic reforms. (Lewis, 1997) 
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Marginalizing Copts had been a strategy of the previous regime as they faced 
institutional discrimination like losing religious courts, delaying church constructions 
and confiscating land and church properties. Even though the army has been seen as the 
guarantor of religious freedom in Egypt, the Free Officers did not have any Christian 
members in rank. 
 
In the Tahrir uprising, the head of the Coptic church Pope Shenouda III told the 
Christian Egyptians not to join the protest against Hosni Mubarak. But as Makade says:  
 
The pope was really popular and they really liked him, but the Christian youth 
kept sharing videos on Internet that meant ‘we respect the pope we got his 
orders but we are Egyptian and we have the right of revolution and be against 
Hosni Mubarak.27 
 
However, the process that followed the uprising shifted the argument. Tadros (2014) 
was saying that ‘Egypt is not Tahrir Square’ and just in the 100 days there were: ‘an 
army raids on a monastery, the arson of churches in Rafah, Sol, Atfih, Dayr Mawas, and 
Imbaba, the looting and burning of property belonging to Copts in the villages of 
Badraman and Abu Qurqas, the assault on Christians in al-Qamadir’.  
 
The Amnesty Report in 2013 (Amnesty International ,2013) stated that there was 
pattern of discrimination against internal security forces for failing to protect Christian 
churches, schools, and charity buildings from an angry mob in the wake of the dispersal 
of two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo. While the report underlined that there were minimum 
15 attacks against Copts in the Mubarak era, the post transition period experienced 
worse. While Masrepo left 17 dead, Egyptian press reports showed that the number of 
sectarian attacks rose from 45 in 2010 to 70 in 2011, the year of the revolution that 
toppled Hosni Mubarak, to 112 in 2012.   In 2013, Coptic Christian activists reported at 
least four attacks on Churches or affiliated buildings in addition to Wasta, taking place 
in the Governorates of Aswan, Beni Suef, Cairo, and Fayoum (Amnesty, 2013). 
 
 
 
                                                
27 Interview with Mahmoud Makade. 9 March, 2015. 
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3.2.1.3. Workers Movement  
 
If the youth in Cairo and Alexandria are connecting with Mahalla, then the government 
knows it is in trouble28 (Shackner, 2011).  
 
Since 2000s and in the uprising, going on strike has been an important tool for disabling 
the flow of capital, disturbing the daily routine, effecting agenda making.29Beinin was 
pointing out  to the fact though there was no nationally recognized leadership of the 
workers movement, they were mobilized quickly and played a crucial role in the fall of 
Mubarak. The strikes of February 8th (for the strikes of 8-9 February see: Apendix 4), to 
February 9th contributed to his fall (Maher, 2011, Alexander, 2011, Alexander & 
Bassiouny, 2014, Beinin, 2012, El-Hamalawyi 2011). 
 
Prior to the protests the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) which was formed in 
1957 was the only trade union federation in Egypt until 30 January 2011. According to 
Alexander, ETUF ran in a Soviet-style manner, obedient to the Nasserist state 
(Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014:153) and as a traditional actor of the Egyptian state it 
claimed monopoly over the workers by blaming them for receiving illegal foreign 
funding.  
 
As Alexander pointed out, the isolated explosions of anger turned into  a collective one 
in 2011. The workers movement was succesful at disorganizing, confusing the regime 
by paralyzing one of its key organs of popular political control, the Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation. (Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014:99) Workers organized and published 
common statements (Revolutionary Socialists, 2011) that led to the formation of the 
Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), at Tahrir Square on 
January 30th, 2011. After EFITU, 2011 experienced the emergence of hundreds of new, 
independent enterprise-level unions becoming a crucial gain after the uprising. Beinin 
argues that independent trade unions remain the strongest nationally organized force 
confronting the autocratic tendencies of the old order (Beinin, 2013). 
 
                                                
28 Mahalla signifies the working class city which was famous for the 2008 strike that led to the formation of the April 
6 Movement 
29 Alexander proposes that the overall size of the Egyptian working class cannot be estimated with the data collected 
by the ILO or the Egyptian state statistics authority CAMPAS (Alexander& Bassiouny, 2014: 61-62). 
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Workers gained experience of temporary direct democratic control over the workplace 
itself, and in a much wider layer of workplaces (Alexander, 2012:200). The total 
number of collective labor actions in 2011 was 1,400 reaching to 1,969 in 2012 and 
2.400 in the first quarter of 2013 alone (Beinin, 2013). The social and economic protests 
were the main factors that led to the fall of Morsi.  
 
3.2.1.4. Muslim Brotherhood  
Gerges (2015) defines the Muslim Brotherhood as ‘a reactionary, ultra-conservative 
social movement that joined the uprisings belatedly and tried to utilize them in order to 
consolidate its power in Egypt and other places. (Kirkpatrick, 2015) The Muslim 
Brotherhood was the most mobilized group that participated in the January Uprising. 
Officially banned in 1954, despite the waves of repression, it grew among many layers 
of the population, underwent ideological transformation as Egypt returned to multi- 
party elections under the eras of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. As Shafik explained: 
‘Sadat’s relationship with Muslim Brotherhood was marked with diversion.  
 
While staying underground and taking place in parliamentary processes in the 2000s, 
the group took place in the uprising three days (though individuals and especially youth 
groups inside the movement participated) after it set off and was the leading actor to 
take place in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Similar to the Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey (JDP), the MB founded the FJP after the uprising. The 
party included Rafiq Habib, a Copt who was a consultant for former Brotherhood 
Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef as well as nearly 1,000 female co-founders (Al-
Anani,2011). 
 
The FJP, turned Muslim Brotherhood into the best organized and most influential 
organization in the country as National Democratic Party was out of the race. While like 
the JDP in Turkey, the Morsi presidency tried to lead mega projects to boost economic 
growth, strikes, restraints and pressure halted them in his short governance.  
 
3.2.2. The Emergence of New Actors 
The ‘new era’ in Egyptian politics can be traced back to 2004 when the first series of 
demonstrations under the Kefeya Movement set off. Egypt then and in the uprisings has 
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been a higly mobilized country. As pointed in chapter two, the square gatherings of 
2000s contributed to the establishment of these new actors. Especially the youth 
movements that Lynch calls ‘self-aware and self-identified’ actors have become a novel 
category for political analysis. (Lynch 2012:24)  
 
Social media was one of the places that the protestors mobilized. The internet emerged 
as a tool that contributed to mobilization. Social media websites like Twitter and 
Facebook were used as alternative communication tools. While street protests were 
dangerous for individuals under authoritarian rule, social media created ‘safer zone’ and 
forums for discussion. The new media led to the creation of more autonomous actors.  
The three important movements that changed the direction of the course of events in the 
last decade were the 6thof April Movement, ‘We are all Khalid Said’ and Kefaya.  
 
Formed by Wael Ghonim, and Rahman Mansour ‘We are all Khalid Said’ was a justice 
campaign launched on the social media platform Facebook30 for Khaled Said, a 28 year 
old young boy from Alexandria that was tortured to death by the police in 2010. The 
campaign was one of the most active organizations in the 2011 uprising and the page 
was a forum for mobilization and discussion.  
 
The 6th of April was a solidarity movement that encompassed different social bases and 
worked grassroots was born on the 6th of April after a general strike at Mahalla and Kafr 
Al-Dawwar textile. As Shafiq31 said; though the movement was born in 2008, it 
extended from the unnamed movement against the occupatıon in Iraq as well as the 
Palestinian intifada prior to that. The movement was effective as an intermediate 
between the workers and the activists.  
 
Kefaya, known also as Egyptian Movement for Change, was a crucial actor in Egyptian 
politics that has pushed for reforms since 2004. The Movement was founded in 
November with 300 intellectuals from different ideological backgrounds (Carnegie 
Endowment for Peace, 2010) in order to pursue a steady strategy in the 2005 elections. 
                                                
30 The Facebook Page of ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ has been a crucial mobilizing tool in the 25th of January. The 
page can be accessed  https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk/ 
31 Interview with Hesham Shafiq, March 20, 2015.	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After the fraud elections the movement focused on specific goals like rejecting the 
possible succession of Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal Mubarak and fighting against 
corruption and emergency law. It was a well-coordinated movement as it can be seen in 
its capacity of holding anti-regime demonstrations at the same time in fourteen cities at 
Egypt in 2005. (Hamzawy, 2005) 
 
The group had the formal representative base as well as an ability to incorporate the 
youth by organizing sit-ins in the square. While they were taken into custody from time 
to time they were consistent on rights and freedoms and one demand: democratization 
and the enlargement of rights.  
 
The 6th of April like Kefaya and We are all Khalid Said used online networking tools to 
gain support while on the other other hand, organizers of the the 6th of April urged 
followers to demonstrate their support for the workers by wearing black, staying at 
home, and boycotting products on the day of the strike.  Their methods and previous 
activism was transferred to Tahir Square in 2011, though this time with unprecedented 
numbers.  
 
3.3. Analysis of the First Wave 
 
In the first wave protesters effectively outnumbered the central security forces by 
physically defeating them in street battles over four days. Apart from outnumbering 
they ended the equilibrium that favored authoritarian rule by gaining popular 
legitimacy. What made the Egyptian Uprising not an ordinary protest but a ‘revolution’ 
was the massiveness that the protests portrayed.  
 
Then the military came to the scene on January 28th and chose not to shoot. However, it 
was always supervising the square and asking the protestors to terminate the uprising. 
Calculating the weight of the protests, the institution inserted itself into the central 
position and altered the ruling coalition (Stacher, 2012:84). When Sharp’s list (2012) 
for the threats to dictatorship interpreted at the Egyptian case concluded that the 
fulfillment of the four points (See: Table 9) resulted in the removal of the dictator.  
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 Source: Sharp, 2012 
 
3.3.1. Protestor’s Gains  
Sharp’s list of non-violent protest characteristics were enforced with group 
representations (the Revolutionary Youth), prayer and worship giving protests 
legitimacy  (Friday prayers in the square), songs (voices of the revolution), honouring 
the dead (martyrs of the revolution32), public assemblies, civil disobedience (disobeying 
curfews), civil resistance, online activism (efficient use of social media networks), riots, 
strike and the occupation of urban places in the 18 days that led to Mubarak’s fall. 
 
Unity was the determinant reason for the success of the 2011 protests. Many layers of 
the Egyptian society were at the square from women to workers, civil servants to the 
unemployed. Neither the groups that propelled the revolution, nor the civil society 
players, nor the Islamic movement can credibly claim sole ownership or leadership of 
the uprising. 
 
This was reflected through a participants’ observation. Amr Alim, who joined the 
                                                
32 See Appendix 2 for Martyrs of the Revolution. 
Table 9: Sharp’s Checklist 
   
Reasons for Dictatorial Fall  Egyptian Examples 
1. Cooperation of different 
groups 
The uprising became a ‘people’s movement’ that 
gathered the participation of different social bases.  
2. The requirements of past 
policies clashing with 
conflicting policies 
Privatization policies, lack of infrastructural, 
restraints of freedom of speech, fraud elections 
ended the social contract united the opposition. 
3. Internal institutional 
conflicts 
  
NDP members and ministers resigned. The 
military decided to sacrifice Mubarak. 
4. The explosion of regional, 
class, cultural or national 
differences 
Christians protected Muslims on Friday prayers. 
Popular chants included ‘Muslim, Christian hand 
to hand.’ 
A superior Egyptian identity created with the 
legitimacy of Tahrir. 
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protests said that the Muslim Brotherhood was highly present with other political 
parties’ (Noshokaty, 2011) but pointing that the slogans (See Appendix 2: Chants of the 
Egyptian Uprising) under justice, equality and freedom were more dominant in the 
square rather than the ideologies of particular groups. As Alim underlined, under each 
slogan there was a list of popular demands (England, 2011). 
 
The success of the protests came with the insistence of protestors not to leave the square 
and to occupy urban places.  The longer they refused to leave the meidan, the more they 
grew in numbers and stopped being intimidated (Stancer, 2012:296). The main 
strategies of the regime such as hiring thugs, chaos scenarios, shutting down the means 
of communication was blocked through physical unity in a certain location that 
enhanced the component of unity. In the squares protestors used non-violent strategies 
like public speeches (forums in Tahrir square), declarations by organizations and 
institutions (doctors, textile workers, judges), and signed public statements.  
 
‘Bringing down the Hobbesian thesis’ which created the means to provide security was 
one of the reasons why the movement succeeded.  Life was not nasty, brutal or short in 
the squares. The country was not dragged into chaos. The disappearance of the police 
after mass participation and street clashes with the security forces was the primary gain 
of the popular movement. The protestors founded their own security forces called 
‘popular committees’, to assure safety of their surroundings. Even though there was an 
absence of the security forces as Tadros (2012) noted there were no attack on religious 
sites and on the Copts in the eighteen days. This dynamic was not sustained during the 
other waves. 
Using communication efficiently, especially with social media, was a crucial dynamic 
of the uprising. As Lynch points out the documentation of violence created a forced 
knowledge of the atrocities into the public sphere, making it impossible to deny their 
reality (Lynch, 2012:173). However, the communication did not take place solely with 
the social media. From the first day of the uprising popular communities again used a 
variety of tools ranging from slogans, caricatures and symbols, banners, posters and 
radio stations to journals that created popularity for the movement. The documentation 
of facts ended with an apology from an institution, the state newspaper Al-Ahram. 
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The ability of the movement to attract popular figures both raised legitimacy and sent 
messages to the regime. The particiapation of Essam Sharaf -signifying the government 
as he was the the Minister of Transport in Nazif government 2004-, Tantawi the head of 
army, famous public figures, Al-Baradei and celebrities like the Egyptian film star 
Omar Sharif as internationally known figures gave more legitimacy to the square. 
 
The legitimacy was further enhanced by one determinant factor; strikes. The Egyptian 
uprising had the effect of a general strike. While the country was almost shut down in 
the 18 days, starting from the tourism which makes up 5% of the Egyptian economy, 
there were many hindrances to cash flow. The protestors put such an economic burden 
so that a resolution had to be reached. As it had reached 300.000 workers in less than 
two days (Alexander, 2012) the strikes of 8-9 February were crucial for Mubarak’s fall. 
The strike by the public transport authority workers was particularly important to halt 
the daily routine of the public.33 
 
Staying peaceful34, was a uniting element. Roberts (2016) was underlining that the non-
violent aspect of the uprisings brought participation as well as international support and 
helped to the loss of legitimacy in authoritarian contexts. The calls to listen to the 
protestors from the US, Turkey and Europe came from this outlook. The turnout to the 
protest multiplied day by day. The repression from the regime did not discourage the 
protesters, on the contrary, strengthened their resolve. Protestors went to the locations 
that represented the regime with different tactics, not always with marching but 
conquering the location by outnumbering security forces.  
 
Lastly, the military’s choice: ‘not to shoot’ that Bellin (2012) describes as the crucial 
point for a social movement led to Mubarak’s fall in 2011.  
 
 
 
                                                
33 The strike by the public transport Authority workers was particularly important in this respect because Public 
Transport activists went to Tahrir and distributed a statement announcing their decision to strike on 9 February. 
34 By naming at ‘Staying Peaceful’ the research approaches the 18 days as a non-violent popular movement. For the 
characteristics of a non-violent movement see the strategies of Sharp (2012) at Appendix 1: List of Non-Violent Tactics 
by Sharp.	  
	  
 
 
72	  
 
Table 10: Factors that led to Mubarak’s Fall 
1- Unity 
2- Non-Violent Protest 
3- Occupation of Urban Places 
4- The ability to provide security 
5- The efficient use of communication tools 
6- The participation of popular figures  
7- Strikes  
8- The military’s choice: ‘not to shoot’ 
 
 
3.3.2. Regime Tactics 
Repression was one of the main tools that the regime used (Bassiouni, 2016) which 
included arrest, torture, use of tear gas, deporting foreign journalists, sexual harrasment 
and at the end killing. The resounding success of the first wave of protests was met with 
extreme brutality by the Ministry of the Interior using their strong arm the Central 
Security Force (CSF) with the thugs that were apparent on the 1st and 2nd of February, 
but the tactic backfired as the protestors insisted on staying in central locations, in front 
of government buildings and suppress the attackers, catching and revealing their 
relationship with the regime.  
 
Killing the protestors was a tactic to criminalize the movement.  In the 18 days, 1075 
died at 25 provinces, of whom 1022 were civillians, 49 were policeman, 4 soldiers, 1 
journalist, 5 volunteers. Of the people that lost their lives 23 were woman, 108 were 
under 18, 92 were highschool and university students. (For a detailed account of deaths: 
Appendix 3: Martyrs of the Revolution) This strategy backfired, too, as the dead 
baceme the martyrs of the revolution and one of the pillars in the quest to confront the 
regime atrocities.  
 
In order for people to end protest activity, curfews were declared at Port Said, Suez, 
Alexandria, Dametta, Luxor, Suez, Mahalla, Mensyra. This was a dud tactic as the 
massiveness of the movement de facto lifted the order. 
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However, disabling the means of communication was where the regime was ridiculed. 
On the third day of the uprisings in order to disable protestors from gathering, the 
regime shut down internet services in the country along with Twitter and Facebook. 
This repression was taken down with vendors and text messaging systems that replaced 
the internet and more people joining the protests. 
 
Concessions with official public speeches happened gradually over the course of 18 
days. Mubarak gave three speeches one on 28th of January, the others on February 1st 
and 10th.  
 
In his first speech Mubarak promised reforms saying that he respected the legitimate 
concerns of the people but would not tolerate chaos in the streets, adding that "to the 
point of exhaustion" he was devoted to his country and would "defend freedom and 
stability." He pledged more democracy, stability and jobs, saying that he was willing to 
engage in a "national dialogue." Then he fired his cabinet. (‘Mubarak fires cabinet’, 
2011) However, as the regime had lost its legitimacy the opposition did not see it as a 
partner to negotiate with. They chose the army instead. While Mubarak addressed the 
nation again two times with more concessions and delivering rights, he promised not to 
run again and that elections would take place by the end of the year. On the 10th while 
he was insisting that he would stay, the next day he was toppled down. 
 
Provoking the fear of instability and the fear of Islamists taking over was an 
authoritarian survival tactic from the beginning. On 9th Februrary Egypt’s Vice 
President Omar Suleiman made a statement that the government will not tolerate civil 
disobedience saying that the only option is ‘dialogue or coup’, while on the other hand 
the editor-in-chief of a pro-government paper; Osama Saraya,  who attended Suleiman‘s 
meeting said that he did not mean only a military coup but also a possible takeover by 
state institutions or Islamist groups (‘Egyptian opposition defiant over VP's warning’, 
2011). Al-Ahram, the biggest state newspaper used headlines like ‘the Final 
Opportunity: Stability or Chaos’ ‘Danger of Division.’ (Trager, 2011)  
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Opening the doors of prison as an international strategy for regimes to hold on to power 
occurred during these 18 days when Abood El-Zomor who was the organizer of Anwar 
Sadat’s assassination was released with other convicts from Gamaa El-Islamiya 
(Ghoraba, 2013). By this means the government tried to negotiate with the Brotherhood. 
The Brotherhood did not give in. At the same time, the military during the 18 days 
continued to tell the protestors ‘to go home’ as a motto of being a ‘True Egyptian’ 
acting for the state as continous protests harmed the country. If the protestors had fallen 
for this trap maybe Mubarak would not have been toppled.   
 
While Mubarak was announcing that he dismissed the government the baltagiya 
attacked the square. Reversing his words with behavior, this tactic did not work on the 
protestors. Then the first concession followed was the cabinet shuffle by firing the ‘neo-
liberal’ team. The 5th of Februrary marked massive resignitions from the NDP including 
Gemal Mubarak. The internal cohesion of the regime was broken and the next step had 
to come: ‘Sacrificing Mubarak’.  
 
As the contentious protests did not stop, the military made the February 10th 
intervention as the final step of the tactic: sacrificing Mubarak for the sustaining the 
regime (Kandil, Ottoway, Neguip, 2011 and Lynch, 2013). This tactic was the one that 
worked as the cohesion between the military elites and Mubarak had come to an end. In 
a restrained relation, the army saw this opportunity to grasp power. For Hashim it was 
‘the military's reluctance to save the regime from a people's revolution was the prime 
factor in the regime's relatively quick downfall’ (Hashim, 2011). 
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3.4.Analyis of the Second Wave  
In the second wave, the army implemented repression measures to terminate the 
occupation movements based on certain demands that were vivid continuously. 
However, one characteristic of the wave was the first free elections of Egyptian history 
but as Kandil puts it: ‘Egyptians voted decisively for the revolution—yet, alas, their 
votes were scattered among the five revolutionary nominees, thus failing to carry any of 
them to the second round.’ (Kandil, 2012:520) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Authoritarian Survival Strategies  in the First 
Wave 
 
1.   Repression 
2.   Curfews  
3.   Disabling Means of Communication 
4.   Opening the doors of prison 
5.   Concessions with Official Public Speeches 
6.   Changing the Cabinet 
7.   Sacrificing Mubarak 
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   Source: Freedom House Country Report (2012). 
 
Guaranteeing structural superiority to the military, the constitutional amendments in 
March 2011 gave legitimacy for the army to conduct the transition. SCAF’s declaration 
limited the power and the number of presidential terms in Egypt and called for general 
Table 12: Events and Results in the Second Wave 
Date Event Result 
25 February 
2011 
The Protests for the 
Resignition of Shafik 
The army uses force for the first time 
against the protestors. (though issues 
apology the day after) 
 
9 March 2011 The Protests for the 
Resignition of Shafik 
Brutal intervention by the military. 
Arrests,  
virginity tests conducted to woman. 
15 May 2011 Sit-in for Civillian Rule 
and Justice 
Military officers join the sit in are 
brutally taken into custody. Clashes 
lead to the death of Ali Maher (17). 
28 June 2011 Sit-ins of the Family of 
the Martyrs Demanding 
Justice  
Brutal intervention by the military. 
Hundreds injured and arrested. 
23 July 2011 The March to Passage to 
Civilian Rule and Justice 
Police controlled thugs interfere, 
causes the death of Mohamed Mohsen. 
(23) 
1 August 2011 First Day of Ramadan 
Intervention 
The ones that insisted to stay in the 
square until their demands were made 
are arrested and sent to military trials.  
9 October 
2011 
Masrepo Events  Peaceful Coptic Protest  at the state 
television building attacked by the 
army leading to 28 deaths. 
19 November 
2011 
Sit-in for Completing the 
Revolution 
5 day confrontation of protestors and 
the military ends in the death of 90. 
Many cases of loss of eyesight.  
16 December 
2011  
Sit-in in front of 
Government 
Headquarters for 
protesting the newly 
elected Ganzoury 
Confrontation of the military ends in 
the death of 15. 
29 December 
2011 
NGO Crackdown Trials against NGO’s for receiving 
foreign funds 
 
1 February 
2011  
Port Said Massacre  74 football fans die due to stadium riot. 
Military ruled blamed by opposition 
groups.  
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referendum. This closed the way for a true transformation and as they rushed to a 
parliamentary election based on a faulty electoral law, the elections had to be canceled.  
 
The interim changes were used to postpone structural changes and the work on a new 
constitution. One of the main strategies that the military used was to judge civilians at 
military courts, even arresting bloggers who were perceived as a challenge to the 
regime. The military send 12.000 people to military trials in the transition process 
(Alexander, 2012:36).  
 
Taking the Brotherhood as an ally, the first government formed after the uprising 
included figures associated with the opposition. While the military needed a civilian 
partner to conduct the interim process and safeguard its dominant role in the 
institutional power triangle, the emerging revolutionary seemed destabilizing and ‘too 
curious’. As Kandil put: a traditional actor that can assure their privileged position the 
Brotherhood, who was the most organized opposition group in the country, seemed like 
a good ally (Dazey, 2013). 
 
After taking Brotherhood to their side and disabling them from joining the street 
movement, selective repression was used to the protestors. This started with clearing 
off the squares and the confrontations with the protestors that tried to push the military 
for change in April, July, and November. One of the dividing points was the Maspero 
demonstration in October 2011 when Copts protested the demolition of a church near 
Aswan, which left 28 killed and 212 injured.  
 
Between 19-14 November 2011, 45 were killed protesting against military rule in street 
battles around Mohamed Mahmoud, and on 16 December 2011, demonstrations outside 
the cabinet office led to 17 deaths. The Port Said massacre that was directed to the 
Ultras was one of the biggest examples of selective repression in the interim period. 
When existing laws stood in its way, the SCAF decided to change the rules to its 
advantage by outlawing protests with law against sit-ins. This power came from another 
institutional partner; the constitutional court. The repression was strengthened with the 
re-establishment of Emergency Law after the storming of the Israeli, and Saudi 
embassies, which was used as a means to re-start the emergency law.  
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Sexual assault against female protestors, on the other hand, was one of the crucial 
strategies to marginalize woman protesters and stop them from engaging in political 
activity. While even Hillary Clinton was addressing the military rulers to end this 
maltreatment, the military was stripping females in front of their male counterparts 
(Alexander, 2014:139) a tactic used by many authoritarian settings like the 1980 coup in 
Turkey. Military officials made statements to further polarize the society regarding 
these girls such as that they were ‘not like your daughter or mine’ to justify virginity 
tests (Amin, 2011). 
 
However, after being exposed to such treatments the struggles created figures like 
Samira Ibrahim, who went public and empowered other protestors. In an interview 
Shahira (2011) underlined while it was pointed out that the military was working in 
their favor so that they would not be raped, the institution was responsible of ‘beating, 
giving electric shocks, strip-searching, and threats of prostitution charges’ (Watson 
&Fahmy, 2011). 
 
Storming NGO’s was another tactic to silence and scare off opposition groups and 
create division by labeling the NGO’s as foreigners and possessing a hidden agenda for 
interfering in internal affairs of Egypt. On December 29th the military raided into 17 
foreign NGO’s offices, arrested members including foreigners accusing of them causing 
unrest and protest in the country with espionage. In addition to the NGOs, SCAF 
accused the the July sit-of being funded by foreign powers trained to cause havoc within 
the country (Alexander, 2014:36).  
 
While SCAF used these strategies to hold on to power, it could not escape the wave of 
protests that derived from the persistence of authoritarian rule in the aftermath of the 
uprising. The images in April reminded the good old days of Tahrir, fresh with 
thousands demanding Mubarak’s (then Tantawi’s) punishment and a transition to civil 
forces while the November Riots were uniting the opposition once again.  By this 
means in order to contain street protests the parliamentary elections were pushed as an 
exit strategy followed by the presidential ones.  
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Table 13: Authoritarian Survival Strategies in the Second Wave 
 
1.   Selective Repression 
2.   Judging Civilians at Military Courts 
3.   Taking Brotherhood as an Ally 
4.   Re-emergence of the Emergency Law 
5.   Storming NGOs  
6.   Law Against Sit-ins 
7.   Pushing Parliamentary Elections as an Exit 
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3.5.Analysis of the Third Wave 
Apart from the demands of the uprisings, the divides dominated the third cycle that led 
the coup. Not only the structures from the institutions but also pressure from below led 
to Morsi’s fall (Kingsley, 2011). 
 
Primarily, Morsi failed to be a president of the ‘Egyptian Revolution’. Though he 
declared some amnesties for the January 25 youth, he enhanced the position of SCAF. 
He safeguarded its privileges even when Tantawi was taken from rule, by bestowing 
him with honor. This was strengthened in the November 2012 constitutional 
declarations that caused a huge divide over the power of the president. In reality what 
the constitutional declaration did was to push the military while giving it legal 
protection and immunity (Khawaga, 2012) that disabled the quest for justice after the 
uprising. On the other hand, Morsi refused to take on the Ministry of Interior. Instead, 
he appointed Ahmad Gamal Eddin, the former minister of interior as chief of the Assiut 
Security Directorate (Hamilton, 2013). 
 
The Brotherhood fell into the trap that the military dug. Rather than implementing 
polices of progressive taxation, or confront the military’s economic empire, the 
Brotherhood looked to negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a way out. 
The escalating fiscal crisis was a blow to Morsi’s popularity.  
 
Since coming to power in mid-2012, the Brotherhood was the strongest force in the 
parliament and with Morsi’s victory of the presidency. However, it never possessed the 
real capacity to rule. Just as Morsi came to power, the parliament was declared 
unconstitutional. As Brown (2013) underlines the rule of SCC pronouncing that the 
elections were against the constitution was a tactic as a way for the old institution to 
hold legitimacy and to sustain its political role after the attainment of the president.  
 
What can be interpreted from Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) is that a similar case 
of the 2005 elections was portrayed in 2012 to 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Back then the regime was securing the parliament with NDP majority to control the 
plenary debates, ensuring that the opposition lacked the numerical strength to obstruct 
the passage of critical government legislation. This time, the actors changed.  The party 
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in fact never ruled. 
 
The Opposition was fragmanted immensly on the third wave. While the process started 
with the 2011 Constitutional Amandments as the Brotherhood conqured power, the 
opposition was margenalized and afraid that the Brotherhood was going to rule out the 
revolutionary process. This was strengthened with the constitutional amandments and 
the fragmented opposition united under the National Salvation front to topple Morsi this 
time.  
 
At the end of the third wave, political opposition was expertly divided and contained.  
Just like the Mubarak era, the unity against Morsi was sustained but this time except 
Muslim Brotherhood on the team. However, the team was joined by members of the 
feloul. Originating from Brown this led to ‘using popular discontent for the military 
coup’35 (Brown, 2013). 
 
One of the tactics that the military inherited from the first wave was to use chaos and 
instability by ‘leaving the squares run loose.’ The army did not hesitate to shoot the 
protestors in the second wave, but was tentative in the first and the second. In the first 
wave during events like the Battle of Camel in Tahrir Square, the military stayed 
‘neutral’ and chose not to interfere and protect the protestors.  
 
In the third wave, especially after the constitutional declarations, the security forces 
refused to serve the president. While a massive police strike paralyzed the security 
system, the military chose not to interfere to the clashes between the two conflicting 
camps; one pro, one against Morsi. On the other hand, in cities where curfews were 
declared the military disregarded Morsi’s orders (even organized a football tournament 
during the order).  
 
While sit-ins turned violent after the events of the anniversary of the revolution, the 
army did not fire a single bullet and did not protect the presidential palace between 
February 26th and March 3rd protests and throughout March to July in Cairo. Morsi 
                                                
35 Brown defines the July intervention as ‘a military coup’ in response to public pressure which pushed the political 
leadership of the country aside (Brown, 2013). 
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called on his own supporters to safeguard the palace which led to the creation of pro 
Morsi thugs similar to the baltagiya’s of Mubarak. The chaos and instability contributed 
to the legitimation of the coup.  
 
Also on March 2013, the police in more than a third of Egyptian provinces went on 
strike, including in parts of Cairo and in Port Said, which caused a security and 
legitimacy problem for the Brotherhood. 
 
 
Table 14: Authoritarian Survival Strategies in the Third Wave 
 
1.   Declaring the Parliament Unconstitutional 
2.   Using Popular discontent for the military coup 
3.   Fragmenting the Opposition 
4.   Using Chaos and Instability 
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3.6.How Did It Survive?  
In the Egyptian case, there was the victory of continuous authoritarian governance and 
the deterioration of democracy rather than an affirmative transition after the uprisings. 
Until the end of 2012 Egyptians went to the polls four times for military’s constitutional 
changes, followed by parliamentary, presidential elections and the constitutional 
referendum of November 2012. However, each election was marked with less 
participation signifying the despondency to one of the trivial characteristics of 
democracy. 
 
The dismissal of Mubarak took place because there was a sudden change in the balance 
of resources between the rulers and the ruled. As Bowen (2013) points out what made 
the removal of Mubarak possible in January 2011 was the formation of a ‘critical mass 
that was too big to be intimidated’.  In this sense, the non-violent movement achieved 
its primary goal, but could not be durable.  
 
According to Tilly’s definition of contentious politics which included four key features; 
worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (2006) the Egyptian Uprising of 2011 
ticked all the items on the list. The worthiness drove from the legitimacy of Tahrir 
Square. The unity came with the common demands, slogans and the formation of a new 
popular identity. Numbers with the million marches and commitment; risking life for 
the goal to succeed.  
 
Authoritarian survival is a dialectic process that shapes regime responses with the threat 
conceived. The opposition contributed to regime survival as their division and 
organizational problems started directly after the first wave. While non-violent social 
movements can achieve certain goals, what determines their durability is a crucial point 
of investigation. In the Egyptian case, it was seen that the opposition did not unify at the 
demands at the post-Mubarak period.  
 
In the context of this research the overall strategies that led to authoritarian 
reconstruction can be gathered under two headlines that cover the survival strategies in 
Egypt after the historical case of 2011 uprisings. These are; authoritarian adaptation that 
came with overthrowing one institution to be replaced with another which is named as 
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‘sacrificing Mubarak,’ the institution of presidency. The second one was that can be 
named as ‘stealing the revolution’ -a popular discourse that was used by the activists in 
the square both for the military rule and Morsi era- through dividing the opposition and 
altering the standing of the togetherness of 2011. While the first tactic was done to 
provide the inner coherency of the ruling elites, the second one was conducted to the 
outer scope of the regime.   
 
3.6.1.   Tactic 1: Authoritarian Adaptation by Sacrificing Mubarak 
In the Egyptian case the popular mass mobilization received a response with the 
intervention of the armed forces where one institution presidency was disposed and 
another pillar of the state taking control. As Stacher names the take over as conquering 
the ruling coalition, (Stancer, 2012) Lynch explains the take over as:  
‘the rebellions were met with disciplined responses and prompt decisions to sacrifice 
the regime or at least its incumbents in favor of the stability equilibrium and repeatedly 
misjudged the timing and extent of repression’ (Lynch, 2012:13). 
 
The military made its choice, calculation. It decided that the interference would be 
healthier. By not participating but containing the protests in the first wave, it achieved 
two things. First avoiding the consequences of the street movement with no clear 
outcomes and second hindering any counteraction from officers at low ranks. In this 
historic political revolution, that Brown names a political coup, the ruling coalition was 
changed on the side of SCAF while ‘the state’ remained untouched. SCAF had both 
forced Mubarak’s departure and got into the emptied centralized authority (Brown, 
2013, Stacher, 2012). 
 
Under the broad strategy of authoritarian adaptation, the military slide into the void that 
was created with Mubarak’s departure. However, this was not sufficient to guarantee 
authoritarian survival. By these means, the army adapted to the dynamics of the 
movement by first not shooting to the protestors and embracing the revolution as the 
new reality of the Egypt after the uprising (visible through public statements). These 
were the authoritarian survival strategies deployed at the second wave. However, the 
extensive repression in the second wave unsecured the position that the military had 
gained.  
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When contention rose, the waves fed each other, and the military transferred the titles of 
institutions to a selected partner that was promising the stable, robust role of the 
military. While the parliamentary and presidential elections were conducted, the 
military was behind the scenes in a solid position. In the third wave, it was tranquil as 
the confrontations took place. When the mass movement was transformed into a 
collective action that resembled 25/11, the military decided to turn the movement to 
itself, which also became the last step; using popular discontent for the military coup.  
 
While taking the place that was abandoned, in an in-depth interview Morsi’s ex-
economic adviser Hussein Qazzaz was proposing that a transition never took place in 
Egypt by saying that:  
 
‘I don't think that the technical term is not transition, because transition would require 
some kind of a plan that will take you from point A to point B, in the paradigm this was 
not the case of Egypt, it was not the case yet, the Egyptian bureaucracy still operates the 
same way more or less. It operates the same way under Mubarak, under military rule, 
Morsi and the new regime. There is not yet a sense of change.36’ 
 
The strong Egyptian state that was founded with the 1952 coup still had legitimacy. In 
the second run it could survive with the previous strategies that enabled Mubarak to stay 
in power. Morsi tried to capture the institution the presidency and strengthened his seat 
but it was too fragile and inadequate to stay in power. While the popular movement had 
brought new dynamics the Morsi administration failed to see them. 
 
Stacher’s study on ‘adaptable autocrats’ (2012) answered the first layer of authoritarian 
survival after mass mobilization in the Egyptian case. The old regime did not solely 
consist of Mubarak. In the interim and new parliament, there were figures from the old 
regimes cooperating with a new head, the military. In the parliamentary elections, 
Shafik’s presidency and popularity showed that the old regime was still in power. They 
were not outlawed, or many members of the old regime were not brought in front of 
justice.  
 
Stacher’s answer to the situation is that the structure of executive power was centralized 
                                                
36	  Interview	  with	  Husein	  Qazaz.	  June,	  15,	  2014.	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in Egypt before the uprising. When the uprising set off, the more homogeneous 
character of the Egyptian society (unlike Syria) helped the protesters to get over their 
previous collective action problems.    
However, while this was a uniting element, he explains how the regime survived the 
wave: 
Their (protestors) unified mobilizing pressure, combined with a rapid change in the 
balance of power between the coercive forces and the demonstrators, enabled a dynamic 
whereby members of the centralized ruling coalition could be and had to be dropped to 
save the regime. (Stacher, 2012:18)  
 
As discussed in the literature, (Kandil,2011, Ottoway, 2011, Lynch, 2012) Mubarak was 
sacrificed to save the regime.  
 
 
3.6.2.   Tactic 2: ‘Stealing the Revolution’ and Dividing the Opposition  
Kandil had summarized the differences between the 1952 revolution and the 2011 
uprising as:  
 
…what happened in 1952 in fact had been revolutionary legitimacy, because the Free 
Officers carried out the revolution and seized power. Now we have a different situation, 
where those who revolted on January 25, 2011 were not the ones who seized power 
(Kandil, 2012:498). 
 
Porta’s (2014) recent work contributed to Tilly’s exclusions of military coups as a 
social movement provided a definition for the Tamrood campaign that led to the 
military takeover in July 2013. In her categorization to the mobilization to democracy 
she uses two options; elite or mass driven. While the mass- driven is called eventful 
democratization, the elite-driven is understood as a disruptive coup d’état that is a 
manipulation of mass protest to win over conservative groups. The army benefited from 
the popular outrage against Morsi and manipulated the social movement on its behalf 
and restored its position in the authoritarian structure in the country. 
 
By these means the most successful tactic of the regime was the deliberate manipulation 
and division of opposition forces. The Egyptian Uprising was neither an Islamist nor a 
solely class motivated one. It was not the moment of the Muslim Brotherhood, either. It 
was a peoples’ mobilization that could not be treated like the movements before. This 
was the reason why the regime tried to frame it as a Muslim Brothers mobility but later 
on failed to find evidence.  
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The major setback was the inability to create a united front that is called ‘cooperative 
differentiation’ in the social movements literature which is described as ‘maintaining a 
public face of solidarity towards the movements targets’ (Bandy, Smith 2005 Abdel, 
2009) that allows diverse political groups with different ideological leanings, class 
interests and long term project to work together. The opposition did not possess 
organizational and institutional leadership to take power and replace the regime of the 
president (El-Bishry, 2011) or as Ghobashy underlines, no population group had 
become close to shifting the balance of resources in favor (Ghobashy, 2012).  It was 
controversial to the view that the uprising was ‘leaderless’. In fact, the Egyptian 
revolution had many leaders, soon to be fragmented.  
Josua and Edel (2012) underline that elites have wider strategies but repression remains 
a crucial part of its target groups, specific forms. One fact was that the army did not 
confront all opposition groups at the same time.  As repression rises when legitimacy 
falls in the protests there was a contentious change of the use of restraint and at the end, 
the Egyptian elite/authorities who have control of the state apparatus decided that 
containing and fragmenting the movement was a healthier way. When fragmented the 
concentrated repression was not delegitimized.  
3.6.2.1. Mistakes of the Brotherhood and the Opposition 
However, apart from elite strategies, the responses of the opposing groups in Egypt 
contributed to the outcome in 2013. The selective repression that was used by the 
regime was the primary tool for it to hold on to power as a divided opposition was 
proved easier to be ruled.  
The military especially after the creation of National Salvation Front saw opposition as 
a potential political ally to check another. Brown (2013) says that after the Islamist 
majority that came with the parliament and the presidency, a new block occurred 
consisting of opposition to old regime elements and judges. Naming the block counter-
revolutionary, it contributed to the persistence of military domination rather than 
passage to civilian rule. 
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This was a clear point that again Hamilton was making: 
In November 2011 and in January 2012 the streets echoed with chants 
demanding the end of military rule. But now it had become the self-appointed 
role of the politicians to translate street action into political gain. Now, the army 
had people to talk to. Had all the forces that were supposedly against the 
military—the revolutionaries, the liberals, the Brotherhood and the Salafist ever 
truly united where might we be today? (Hamilton, 2013).  
On the other hand, Shain noted that the Muslim Brotherhood was ‘not a revolutionary 
organization but came in a revolutionary time that required revolutionary measures’ 
(Akpınar, 2014) and the former institutions paved the way by marginalizing the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  The main mistake of the Brotherhood was to opt for gradually reforming 
the state and protecting the privileges of the military instead of siding with the 
revolutionary youth and the people of the revolution. Brotherhood thought that a strong 
parliament would provide a robust platform for challenging the central pillars of the 
state which were mainly the security forces, the military, bureaucracy, media, and the 
judiciary. 
 
According to Şahin (2014) one of the ‘mistakes’ of the Brotherhood was that the 
military’s longstanding political and economic privileges remained untouched (Şahin, 
2014). What is more is that they were even institutionalized with the new constitution of 
2012.  Morsi was backed by the military because it was clear that he was going to win 
the elections and behind the scenes, they planned to preserve their own interests.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood saw the elections as a way to overcome and conquer some 
parts of the state apparatus mainly the presidency. However, the power of the 
presidency had shifted after Mubarak. It was not the powerful position of the three 
leaders that came with the main pillar of power, mainly the military legitimacy 
anymore. One of the mistakes that the Brotherhood did was to insist on electoral 
legitimacy by belittling the street movement which was unstoppable under the military 
and Morsi rule (Stacher, 2012b).  
 
On the other hand, there was almost no security official held responsible for killing the 
demonstrators during the revolt itself. On June 2nd, 2012, a judge sentenced Mubarak 
and his last interior minister to life in prison for failing to protect the demonstrators—a 
political rather than a criminal charge—but was forced to release the leaders of the 
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security establishment for lack of evidence. (Kandil, 2012: 511)  
 
3.6.2.2. Sectarianism  
One of the key moments of Tahrir was when Copts surrounded Muslims as human 
shields to stop the police intervention while they were praying. This unity, too, was 
broken up as in total of the third waves as little more than 100 people lost their lives due 
to sectarian events (See: Appendix 3: Martyrs of The Revolution). Sectarian attacks 
rose from 45 in 2010 to 70 in 2011, the year of the revolution that toppled Hosni 
Mubarak, to 112 in 2012.  
 
The use of sectarian discourse as Heydemann and Leenders propose, too, (2011) was 
evident with the examples starting off from the Masrepo Events of October 2011 to the 
clashes between the Muslims and Christians during the third wave. But as Albrecht 
points out religious minorities like Copts in Egypt can make alliances with the regime 
as they presuppose that the regime can protect them from the ones ‘of the dominant 
religion’ (Albrecht, 2010) and that the likelihood of the collapse of the regime can be 
perceived as a threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 15: Authoritarian Survival in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings 
 
1.   Authoritarian Adaptation by Sacrificing Mubarak 
2.   Stealing the Revolution’ and Dividing the Opposition  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The public protests that brought the 30-year-old Mubarak regime to its end in Egypt in 
2011 failed to transform the system which was embedded in the state deeply. While 
successfully forcing Mubarak and his circle to resign, the movement left the core 
institutions of Mubarak's state untouched, paving way to the army’s regain of control 
and postponing a true transformation of the regime to an uncertain time in the future. At 
the end of the three waves the strongest pillar of the Egyptian state, the army conquered 
the centralized executive of the Egyptian regime. 
 
It was mostly due to the inability of the Brotherhood and Morsi’s to understand the 
shifting power balances and the strength of the army and the old state’s institutions. The 
influence of the mobilization level altered the relationship between repression and 
legitimation. While the legitimacy that was gained from Tahrir remained, the use of 
selective repression was never outlawed. From the uprising to the military coup, 
repression was used against different groups in different time frames, breaking one of 
the strongest element of the uprising: unity. With its failure to organize the aftermath of 
the revolution, the power of the protestors remained limited with the ability to mobilize 
the masses.  
 
Another significant reason for the failure in the aftermath was the particular 
characteristics of the Egyptian Regime, which, unlike Syria, did not compose of solely 
of the president (Stacher, 2012). The internal cohesion and compliance within the state 
apparatus determined the fate of authoritarian survival in Egypt. For endurance the 
presidency was sacrificed.  
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Along with the strong roots of the old regime still surviving, the lack of organizational 
and institutional leadership played a substantial role in the failure of the civil resistance 
that toppled Mubarak down. Roberts also highlights that the revival of authoritarianism 
is not due to the weakness of civil resistance movement but rather the complexity of the 
aftermath that requires a new constitutional system (2012). Toppling down the dictator 
proved to be the first step necessary for democratic transformation. However, the 
experience revealed that popular movement that overthrew Mubarak did not have the 
effective organization skills or the leadership to take power and replace the regime 
(Bishry, 2015).  
 
With its long history of privileges in Egyptian state and economy, the military cleverly 
manipulated the civil unrest and turned it into its own advantage. To ensure its 
privileged position, the military demanded protection of their interest during the 
transition process. Failing to grasp the calculated process, the Brotherhood contributed 
to it. While in the second wave there were still contentious protests against the 
privileges and the mismanagement of the army, it managed to put itself off the scene 
until the crucial moment allowing it to come back to governance once again at the end 
of the third wave. If the Brotherhood forces had participated in the just demands of the 
‘second revolution’ –the popular movement against the army from June to November, 
2011- rather than prioritizing the elections, another outcome could have been reached. 
The intense polarization of ‘revolutionary’ (seeking shift in pillars of the state) and 
‘conservative’ (seeking continuity in the mode of governance) forces was counter 
revolutionary. When the Muslim Brotherhood held its grip at the parliament, they 
proposed that the legitimacy was represented by the parliament not the square. They 
were mistaken. 
When investigated today it is clear that what made Tunisia relatively a success rather 
than a case of authoritarian survival has been its national consensus that was supplied 
with an inclusive constitutional process. In contrast, one of the main outcomes of 
authoritarian survival in Egypt was the drop in electoral participation in Egypt, closing 
the way for a desired democratization process in the future. 
 
In the third wave it was clear that conquering the parliament was not an end. In Egypt 
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Mubarak’s forced resignation altered the characteristics of the regime and the challenge, 
but not the state. Unlike Syria, the regime did not compose of solely Mubarak. This is 
especially important when a government faces a serious, sudden threat and reacts by 
using high intensity coercion, like shooting into large crowds. Therefore, the internal 
cohesion and compliance within the state apparatus determined the fate.  
Another area of research would be a comperative outlook to the roles that armies played 
in the uprising as the Tunisian army has never experienced combat and does not 
dominate the domestic economy like the Egyptian one (Anderson, 2011).  
 
Though the thesis focused on the inner dynamics of the Egyptian case, the international 
outlook of the uprising is a necessary arena to be investigated. Salamey and Pearson 
points out that ‘the prioritization of Middle Eastern stability over democratic 
transformation’ in the international sphere strengthened the ability for 
authoritaritarianism to exist (Salamey & Pearson, 2012). While being the warden for 
authoritarian regimes for many decades, the influence of Western countries on the 
mobilization of opposition movements and their capacity to transform inner dynamics is 
an interesting research topic. Especially, the role of exterior countries -mainly Saudi 
Arabia and United States- in maintaining the regime’s privileged position is also a 
compelling issue to be discovered. This is in correlation with the military capacity of 
Egypt and the question what are the sources that the Egyptian military acquires its 
strengths from democracy. 
 
Conditions contributed to the survival of authoritarianism by providing opportunities 
to marginalize and divide the opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood’s short-lived 
governance combined with the military in the quest for conquering the central executive 
failed to achieve the desired democratization in Egypt. When the Brotherhood failed to 
pursue an inclusive route, the regime was successful in pushing the movement to a 
fragmented, polarized and sectarian side.  
 
Apart from the impact of the exterior to the interior or conditions, more research has to 
be done on universal usage of non-violence in comperative cases.  
What can be concluded is that in order to achieve success a campaign must go beyond 
persistence and achieve a shift in power between the opposition and the adversary. If 
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Goldstone’s four pillars for change (2011) is remembered, it has to be backed up with 
the international conditions favoring change. The uprising of 2011 ended up with 
continuity rather than change with a shift in the ruling elite. However, contentious 
politics in Egypt is not over.  
While authoritarian reconstruction has been accomplished in Egypt after the three 
waves, ending in authoritarian reconstruction, survival is a dialectic process. The 
learning process occurs for the challengers and the regime. The fourth wave due to this 
cycle can end up in another uprising or challenge that can come as a surprise at any 
time, with any spark like 2011 did. Despite its failure to achieve transition to 
democracy, the Egyptian uprising ended with some gains like free elections inside 
worker unions, universities and the courage and hope for collective action.  In addition 
to its success or failure in the near future, the results of the unique uprising will be re-
examined.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 List of Non-Violent Tactics by Sharp37 
 
1.   Public speeches 
2.   Letters of opposition or support 
3.   Declarations by organizations and institutions 
4.   Signed public statements 
5.   Declarations of indictment and intention 
6.   Group or mass petitions 
 
7.   Communications with a wider audience 
8.   Slogans, caricatures and symbols 
9.   Banners, posters, and displayed communication 
10.  Leaflets, pamphlets and books 
11.  Newspapers and journals 
12.  Records, radio and television 
13.  Skywriting and earth writing 
 
14.  Group representations 
15.  Deputations 
16.  Mock awards 
17.  Group lobbying  
18.  Picketing 
19.  Mock elections 
 
20.  Symbolic Public Acts 
21.  Display of flags and symbolic colors 
22.  Wearing of symbols 
23.  Prayer and worship 
                                                
37The list of Methods of Non Violent Action from Sharp (2012: 124-135).  
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24.  Delivering symbolic objects 
25.  Protest disturbing 
26.  Destruction of own property 
27.  Symbolic lights 
28.  Displays of portraits 
29.  Paint as protest 
30.  New signs and names 
31.  Symbolic sounds 
32.  Symbolic reclamations 
33.  Rude gestures 
 
34.  Pressures on individuals 
35.  ‘Haunting’ officials 
36.  Taunting officials  
37.  Fraternatilization 
38.  Vigils 
 
39.  Drama and Music 
40.  Humorous skills and pranks 
41.  Performance of plays and music 
42.  Singing 
 
43.  Processions 
44.  Marches 
45.  Parades 
46.  Religious processions 
47.  Pilgrimages 
48.  Motorcades 
 
49.  Honouring the dead 
50.  Political mourning 
51.  Mock funerals 
52.  Demonstrative funerals 
53.  Homage at burial places 
 
54.  Public Assemblies 
55.  Assemblies of protest or support 
56.  Protest meetings 
57.  Camouflaged meetings of protest 
58.  Teach-ins 
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59.  Withdrawal and renunciation 
60.  Walk-outs 
61.  Silence 
62.  Renouncing honors 
63.  Turning one’s back 
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Appendix 2 
The Slogans of the Egyptian Uprising38 
 
1.   January 
1.1.25th of January 
•   We studied, graduated but employment is a destiny. 
•   We don’t want her to be destroyed39, our target is to be free. 
•   Soldier you are shooting why? Am I Egyptian or not? 
•   We are saying million times Mubarak we want you out. 
•   We want free government, the life is becoming disguising. 
•   Revolution, revolution Mubarak out! 
•   People want the downfall of the regime. 
 
1.2.27th of January 
•   The people want the downfall of the regime. 
 
1.2. 28 January 
•   ‘Ya Masr40, it has been long time we have missed you.’ (Soueif, 2012:6) 
 
1.3. 30th of January 
•   Revolution revolution until victory, fall down Hosni Mubarak! 
•   We will not leave, we will not leave, leave, leave Hosni Mubarak! 
•   Jamal tell your father Egyptian people hate him. 
•   Bread, freedom, human dignity… 
•   No Mubarak / No Suleiman / No more Umala Amerikan! (Soueif, 2012:40) 
 
1.4.31 January  
•   Mubarak, Egyptian blood is not cheap.  
                                                
38 The data was derived from the Tumblr page ‘Egypt Chants’ that archives the slogans of popular demonstrations in 
Egypt. Translated by Assiad Aldebiat for this study. Retrieved June 20, 2015, from http://egychants.tumblr.com/ 
39 ‘Her’ signifying Egypt. 
40 Masr means Egypt in Arabic 
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•   No Mubarak, we will not kneel down, we hated our low voice. 
 
2.   February  
2.1.2 February 
•   The people want the execution of President. 
•   Come on people its popular revolution, its peaceful demonstration, come on 
our people join us. 
 
2.2.5 February 
•   Make your voice up hero; you are liberating your country. 
•   Mubarak good morning this is the last day. 
 
2.3. 6 February 
•   High high make your voice high who is chanting wont die.  
•   Egyptian solider defend me protect me. 
•   Void void Mubarak, Jamal, Adly and the parliament. 
 
2.4.From 6 February to 11 February 
•   We didn’t get tired; we didn’t get tired freedom is not free. 
•   Leave leave Suleiman we don’t want you also. 
•   The people want to judge the president. 
•   Egypt for Egyptians not for corrupts and clientalists. 
•   Oh Mubarak, be patient be patient tomorrow the people will dig your grave.  
•   Oh freedom where are you? Hosni Mubarak is between us. 
•   Bread, water Mubarak no! 
•   Fall down, fall down Hosni Mubarak! 
•   Tomorrow Hosni Mubarak will go like Ben Ali  
•   Out out, go out. we don’t want you inside and outside 
•   The people want to judge the president 
•   Be all together one national movement shoulder to shoulder against the 
police who is killing us  
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3.   March  
•   Hit us in the street, our voice will still reach out the world. 
•   Unite your row, put your shoulder next to mine…. A united national movement 
•   Martyr have some good sleep and rest; your blood is a motivation towards 
revolution. 
•   Sit-it sit-in until the system is falls. 
•   Revolution revolution till victory, until we clean all Egypt. 
•   We have removed the head, and still there is the tail. Come on people be strong. 
•   Revolution revolution for freedom. Revolution revolution for purification. 
•   Do you hear the martyr’s mother calling out: the security men kill my sons? 
•   Martyr's blood calling out to you: free free all of your country. 
•   We are not tired yet, we are not tired yet, the freedom is not for free. 
•   We removed Mubarak and the brought to us Shafik, we become tired from 
patching. 
 
4.   April 
•   Silent silent why, you took your rights or what?  
•   Your hand in my hand to take our freedom. We are not thieves or axman. 
•   Revolution is happiness, life with military judgments is not. 
•   Strike its legal, legal against the poverty and hunger, legal against the 
remnants of feloul.  
 
5.   May 
•   Revolution to kick out the clientalists. 
•   Our families, our people the freedom for you and us. 
•   They said revolution, they took Mubarak and put “marshal”. 
•   We are not tired; we need to complete the revolution. 
•   Out out interior ministry out, Egypt my country will stay free. 
•   Dictator dictator the marshal’s time will come. 
•   The strong is strong … the coward is coward, and we will get back to the 
field, strong. 
•   Dictator dictator, and the marshal will get his share. 
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•   Ministry of interior, out out, and my home Egypt will remain free. 
•   We are not tired yet, we are not tired yet, either a full revolution or no 
revolution. 
•   They said this is a revolution, they there will be a change, but they remove 
Mubarak and put a marshal. 
•   Our people, our people the revolution is for you and us. 
•   Full revolution, full revolution that can remove every wicked and traitor. 
 
6.   June  
•   We said bread, freedom no judgment to military.  
•   No subjugation, no torture.  
•   Immortal immortal my homeland, your blood will not go waste. 
 
7.   September  
•   Solider go away the people are not happy. 
 
8.   October  
•   Soldiers building fences, soldiers killing rebels. Fall down fall down military 
government. 
•   We are the people. we are the red line fall down military government. 
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Appendix 3 
‘Martyrs’ of the Revolution 
The information of the ‘martyrs’ are sustained from the web page ‘Wiki Thawra’ an 
independent online group that refers to itself as the “statistical database of the Egyptian 
revolution. The data mainly depends on reports by independent civil society organizations 
including the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Centre (HMLC), and the Front to Defend Egypt’s Protesters (FDEP).  
1.   Day to Day Casualties in the 18 Days41 
In the 18 days there were protests in 22 provinces. In the sum of all days 1075 people 
died. The dispersion of the casualties is: 
•   1022 civilians 
•   49 policemen 
•   4 soldiers 
•   1 journalist  
•   5 volunteers 
866 of the deaths were due to political events and the rest occurred due to the lack of 
security measures in the time being.  
On the other hand, out of the people that were killed 23 of them were women 108 of them 
were under 18 and 92 of them were high school or university students.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41The information is taken from the web page Wikithawra that carries out statistical investigation of the uprising. 
Translated by Ali Alsaleh for this study. Retrieved September, 10, 2015  from 
https://wikithawra.wordpress.com/2013/10/23/25jan18dayscasualities/ 
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Table 16: Casualties in the First Wave 
Day Casualties 
January 25 5 
January 26 2 
January 27 10 
January 28 664 
January 29 118 
January 30 42 
January 31 31 
February 1 11 
February 2 31 
February 3 15 
February 4 5 
February 5 5 
February 6 1 
February 7  4 
February 8 7 
February 9 1 
February 10 1 
February 11 12 
February 12 110 
Source: Wikithawra 
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2. Facts About Casualties in the Three Waves  
 
•   In the 2nd wave 405 of the causalities were civilians, 24 were police officers and 
8 were army personnel. 
•   In the 2nd wave 64 were killed in sectarian incidents. 
•   In the 2nd wave casualties were concentrated in Cairo (174) following Port Said 
(74) and North Sinai (30).  
•   In the 3rd wave out of 470, 399 civilians have been killed and 52 were police 
officers and 19 people were army personnel.  
•   In the 3rd wave 39 were killed in sectarian incidents.  
•   In the 3rd wave casualties were concentrated in Cairo (67) following Giza (67) 
Assiut (64) North Sinai (59) Port Said (56). 
 
 
      
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Source: Wikithawra 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Casualties in the Three Waves  
Wave  Number of Casualties 
 
1st wave 25 January – 12 
February 
 
1075 
 
2nd wave 12 February 2011- 
July 1 2012 
 
438 
 
3rd wave 2 July 2012 - July 3 
2013 
 
470 
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Appendix 4 
Strikes of 8 and 9 February 
 
1. Tuesday, 8th of February42  
About 5,000 employees went on strike in three main centrals (Smart Village Central, 
Central Ramses, Central Alataba). 
 
1,500 workers staged a sit Abu Sabaa Company for Spinning and Weaving in Mahalla, 
they cut off the highway in front of the company to demand overdue  
wages regardless and bonuses. 
 
2,000 workers went on strike from work in “Sigma Pharmaceuticals company “for 
higher wages and the right to obtain promotions, and the dismissal of a number of 
corrupt officials. 
 
3,000 workers protested , demanding an increase incentives and make all daily 
employment in established posts, in “transport Railroad Authority company”  , and they 
sit on the railway rods and disrupted the movement of trains until their demands are 
met. 
 
Nearly 6,000 workers of the Suez Canal Authority in Ismailia, Suez and Port Said 
staged a sit to demand higher wages, pointing out that the Suez Canal is one of the 
biggest sources of income in Egypt. 
 
About 100 workers protested in “Kafr Dawar Silk Company”, and 500 others in “ Kafar 
Dawar Textile Company” before and after work shifts, demanding overdue bonuses and 
increase the meal allowance. 
 
About 4,000 Alkok Company (basic chemical industry) workers in Helwan entered a 
                                                
42 The information is gathered from Revolutionary Socialists, in corporation with the ETIUF (Egyptian Independent 
Trade Unions Federation) and translated by Ali Alsaleh. Retrieved June, 10, 2015  from http://revsoc.me/workers-
farmers/myt-lalf-mn-lml-ywslwn-lhtjjt/  
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strike for higher wages and demanded stable jobs for the workers with temporary 
employment. They also demanded payment of incentives and profits and expressed their 
solidarity with the sit-revolutionaries in Tahrir Square, Workers also demanded an 
investigation into financial and administrative irregularities in the company that was 
investigated by the Central Auditing Organization. They also demanded not sending the 
profits to the “holding company” without regard to improving the conditions of workers 
in the company that makes a profit despite Although they work in a bad atmosphere. 
 
2. Wednesday 9th of February 
 
More than 4,000 workers from the cleaning company "Viola" staged a protest inside the 
company headquarters in Alexandria to demand the lifting of the wage which was only 
500 EGP for ten years. 
 
More than 1,000 workers of Telecom Egypt company protested in front of Central 
Manshiya, to demand higher pay and equality with engineers , they demanded also 
better and fair working hours. 
  
More than 800 dalliy laborers at Petroleum in Marine company protested in front of the 
company headquarters to demand their appointment. 
 
Nearly 800 workers and technicians from the company "Ermez" for railway services 
had sit within the company headquarters of the Mount of Olives in Alexandria, to 
demand the lifting of the salary, install temporary employment  and for obtaining higher 
conditions. 
 
More than 500 nurses and doctors organized  a sit-in within Mabarra Pflmnj Hospital in 
Alexandria, to demand higher wages. 
 
More than 500 Temporary Workers employees at the University of Cairo protested to 
demand the fixation.  
 
Thousands of oil workers protested in front of the Ministry of Petroleum in Nasr City. 
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500 temporary workers at Al Hilal Hospital, strike and staged a sit-in at the 
headquarters of the hospital  demanding the dismissal of all the corrupt leaders. 
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Appendix 5 
 Demands from ‘a group of those in the sit-in’ 
 
By naming themselves as ‘a group of those in the sit-in’ this flyer has been distributed 
by the remaining masses in the square at March 2011. Titled as ‘Why a Sit-In at Tahrir 
Square?’ the flyer answered the following questions under the title ‘Questions: Which 
Have Been Directed at Us and the Response to Them’:  
 
 
• Why are you sitting here? 
 
Well we are staging a sit-in in order to effect our demands. Sit-ins are a guaranteed 
legal right in every constitution in the world and an inalienable human right as part of 
freedom of expression 
 
• How long? 
 
Until the status of this country is improved and our demands are met 
 
• What is your response to some of the negative scenes of the sit-in such as? 
 
We are attempting to deal with each of these happenings as much as possible and 
keeping away anybody who harms the ethics of the sit-in but [we do it] passively and 
without violence. 
 
• But you are destroying the country and the economy is failing… 
 
The country is improving as well as traffic passage and we see the Interior Ministry 
and the police protecting (misspelled in original) the safety of the country, and public 
servants are going to their jobs as usual, and classes have resumed, and we are 
undertaking every social activity as usual. 
 
• Where do you come from?  Certainly someone is paying you? 
 
Come to the square and look at our situation.  It’s hard for you, but we are patient for 
the sake of a better country and we are paid out of our own simple pockets, and at the 
very least the protests are necessary.  You surely see that no one is paying us and 
there’s no KFC43 or any other of the media’s lies. (Tahrir Documents, 2011a) 
 
 
 
                                                
43 In the 1st wave, some media outlets accused the protestors of receiving foreign powers and that they have ordered 
‘Kentucky Fried Chicken’ to Tahrir Square.	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Appendix 6 
Document of the Demands of the 6th of April Movement 
 
The 6th of April published these demands on April 3, 2011 for the transfer to civilian 
rule and holding the feloul accountable: 
1.    To hold Mubarak and his family accountable. 
2.    The return of our stolen money and using it to support the economy. 
3.    The purification of the followers of the former regime from all state institutions, 
at their forefront the media institutions, and to hold accountable all those whose 
corruption is proven. 
4.    To hold accountable all who corrupted political life in Egypt, The dissolution 
of the NDP and the freezing of the political activities of its symbols for a period 
of 5 years. 
5.    To hold a public national conference between the Military Council and the 
whole spectrum of opposition.  The intent of this is to open all the private files 
regarding the administration of the country’s affairs during the Mubarak period in 
order to learn the truth of the country’s current state and to put in place features 
for the upcoming. (Tahrir Documents, 2011b) 
       Figure 2: Extract of the list of Demands of the 6th of April Movement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tahrir Documents (2011b)  
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Appendix 7 
 Petition: Let us Return to the Squares to Complete our Revolution 
 
 The petition was signed on September 15 by:  
•   Popular Socialist Alliance Party 
•   . The National Front for Justice and Democracy 
•   The Popular Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 
•   The Revolutionary Socialists 
•   The Democratic Workers Party 
•   The Egyptian Social Democratic Party 
•   The Campaign to Support al-Baradei 
•   The Youths of the Revolution Coalition 
•   The Lotus Revoution Coalition 
•   Youth of the Front Party 
•   Progressive Revolutionary Youth Union 
•   National Independent Current 
•   Suez Youth Bloc 
•   Youth Movement for Justice and Freedom 
•   Democratic Revolution Coalition (Qana) 
•   January 25th Revolution Coalition (Upper Egypt) 
•   January 25th Revolution Coalition (Luxor) 
•   Democratic Revolution Coalition (Aswan) 
The text: 
The revolution has returned to all of Egypt’s squares and streets yet again to complete 
its course. The masses are once again pouring into the squares to announce that the only 
legitimacy is that of the revolution and the people in the heart of the squares. They 
affirm the masses’ distrust and refusal of the Military Council and its government. They 
refuse a Military Council that intentionally hindered the transitional period and impeded 
the revolution’s course to change and cleansing. They refuse a government that lacks 
power and is nothing but a secretary to the Military Council. They refuse a government 
that does not possess the will or ability to complete the revolution’s course. 
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We, as revolutionary youth forces, insist that the current crisis cannot be solved by 
merely accepting the resignations of Sharaf and his government, nor can it be solved by 
the Military Council appointing a new government which will also lack power. These 
deceptive solutions have been far surpassed by the masses. Now that they have raised 
their main slogans against the 
 Military Council and called for its ouster, these solutions are no longer acceptable to 
them. This cannot be achieved without continuing the popular pressure in all Egypt’s 
squares, because the people are the one guarantee for the continuation of the revolution. 
They are the first and last decision-makers. Thus, we call for all Egyptians to march and 
participate in the million-man mobilization on Wednesday, 22 November, in all Tahrir 
Squares across the length and breadth of Egypt, in order to achieve the following: 
 
- A total relinquishing o political power on the part of the Military Council 
 
- The transfer of power to a National Revolutionary Salvation Government with 
absolute power to direct the transitional phase—This Government will be committed to 
achieving Egyptians’ aspirations in the areas of security and the economy, and setting a 
clear time table for the transfer of power to an elected parliament and president. 
 
- Trying all involved in assaulting civilians, from the Ministry of the Interior or the 
Army beginning on the 25th of June, continuing with the events at Maspero and to the 
massacre of November 19th and 20th. 
 
Where the masses are concerned, the revolution still continues. Our people are in every 
street and square to build—upon the blood of our martyrs and their sacrifices—a new 
country that will achieve freedom and social justice for every citizen. (Tahrir 
Documents, 2011c). 
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Appendix 8 
Full Text of Morsi’s Presidential Speech44 
 
Despite yesterday's tumultuous events, millions of Egyptians will nevertheless head to 
the polls this weekend to pick their first post-revolution president. Egypt's constitutional 
court has invalidated the recent parliamentary election but has allowed Hosni Mubarak's 
former PM, Ahmed Shafiq, to continue to stand for president. As the only other 
remaining candidate, I alone represent an unequivocal departure from the old regime 
that was toppled by the revolution of 2011. 
 
I was nominated and elected by constituents – parties, groups, and individuals – who 
marched the streets of Egypt calling for change. I was jailed by the old regime. I belong 
to the middle classes that were sold out by the old establishment. I hold political and 
social views that are shared by many in our society but were suppressed or criminalised 
by the old regime. I understand the ambitions, values and standards held by many 
mainstream Egyptians. 
 
For the sake of the Egyptian people and for the world, we must find the shortest and 
safest route to a stable, safe and sustainable transition in Egypt. To this end we need a 
detailed programme for change and renaissance, outlining clear priorities and specific 
plans. This I can offer. 
 
On the political front, Egyptians revolted against an oppressive regime with the clear 
aim of regaining their freedom and affirming their liberties. Nothing short of a complete 
overhaul of the political system will be acceptable. It is not enough to remove a ruler or 
restructure a police force. We must spread and reinforce freedom, forming new political 
parties and a free mass media. 
 
At the grassroots, people must be free of government interference, and allowed to 
choose public officials through fair elections. No party or group or class must ever be 
allowed to monopolise the political power in the country. As part of this agenda, I will 
                                                
44 The article is derived from Morsi, June 2013. 
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transform the position of the president to an institution, with clear and delineated roles 
given to a number of vice-presidents (representing political and social forces other than 
the Freedom and Justice party that nominated me, and including a woman for the first 
time in modern Egyptian history), as well as a number of presidential aides and a team 
of advisers, all working in a transparent political environment and subject to oversight 
by parliament and civil society. 
 
Inclusion is also at the core of my economic vision. For decades, economic 
opportunities, along with social status and political powers, were reserved for the very 
few (in their book, Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson state that 
most of the privatization programme in Egypt benefited only 30 families). With 40% of 
the Egyptian population spending less than $2 a day, how could the economy ever grow 
sufficiently to fulfil the legitimate ambitions of Egyptians? Balanced economic growth 
and social justice will be the ultimate objective of my programme, as it was for our 
great revolution as a whole. 
 
Supporting this economic vision is a comprehensive social and human development 
programme aimed at investing in Egypt's most valuable asset: its people, and the large, 
disciplined workforce that Egyptians have proven to be, in spite of monumental 
challenges. 
 
In a highly integrated knowledge-based on global economy, we must encourage both 
the public and private sectors in Egypt to learn from, work and trade with the rest of the 
world. Members of my campaign have already been sending and receiving delegations 
to many countries to explore opportunities for such cooperation. I firmly believe that the 
reform and development objectives of the revolution can be achieved if we work closely 
and very effectively with friendly regional and global forces. 
 
Egypt must emerge again, liberated from dictatorship and the rule of the exploitative 
minority, to occupy its rightful place on the world stage. The absence of Egypt in the 
past few decades has left a dangerous vacuum in the Arab world, and has damaged the 
stability of the region and the prosperity of its peoples. Egypt's destiny is to lead. If I am 
elected on Sunday, I will make sure that Egypt fulfils its destiny. 
